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ABSTRACT 
 
Food quality attributes arising from farming methods are important to many Canadians. 
The credence nature of these quality attributes necessitates some form of quality assurance 
for accurate signalling to consumers. This thesis examines the appropriate role for private, 
third party, and government actors in credible quality assurance systems for production-
derived attributes. Concurrently, it explores the nature of trust that Canadians put in various 
organizations for quality assurance. 
In a nationwide survey, Canadian consumers obtained significant benefits from 
government verification of pesticide free and environmentally sustainable grains contained 
in pre-packaged sliced bread.  The data was collected using a discrete choice experiment. 
Farmers, third party, and government organizations were similarly trusted for accurate 
information about farming methods. The dimensions of this trust varied across 
organizations. Government standards relating to environmental sustainability were 
perceived as most effective. 
Results obtained using a latent class multinomial logit model showed that 
respondents who most valued production-derived food quality also received the greatest 
benefit from government verification and significant negative utility from supermarket or 
third party verification. In relative terms, the difference in utility between third party and 
government verification represents 141% of the value of the environmentally sustainable 
attribute and 87% of the pesticide free attribute. The results suggest that significant 
consumer benefit can be achieved if government were to take a leading role in quality 
assurance for production-derived quality.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Problem Statement 
 
Consumers are increasingly interested in food attributes that can be linked to the 
actions of producers, as witnessed by the increased demand for organic and natural food.  
An increasing awareness amongst Canadian consumers of the health, social, and 
environmental consequences of food choices means that consumer demand for production-
derived attributes extends beyond organic. Some consumers now demand food that is 
produced in a wide variety of ways including environmentally sustainable and animal 
friendly. This type of quality attribute, like organic, is derived from the food production 
process. Production-derived quality is thus the term used in this thesis to embody food 
quality attributes resulting from practices at the primary level of production (i.e. farming).  
To meet this need there has been an increasing presence of firms marketing food 
quality attributes derived from production methods. Smaller firms tend to market directly 
through local marketing channels like farmers’ markets. Larger firms market their product 
primarily via multi-level agri-food supply chains and frequently reinforce production-
derived quality claims with certification from retailers, processors, non-profit organizations, 
and other certification agencies. Despite this rapid expansion in the number and variety of 
production-derived claims, it is unclear how consumers perceive the credibility of these 
claims. 
Government policy is generally thought to have a role in enhancing social welfare 
and correcting market failure, including situations of information asymmetry. It is unclear 
how Canadians perceive quality assurances coming from different types of organizations – 
i.e. if different types of organizations are equally trusted for accurate information. Markets 
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for credence
1
 attributes usually rely upon some form of quality assurance to function 
effectively. Thus, it is beneficial for the functioning of market mechanisms and social 
welfare that quality assurance schemes are credible. Credible assurance schemes enable 
consumers to confidently purchase food produced in ways they desire. Given that firms 
have an incentive to maximize profits whereas government is concerned with social welfare 
more broadly, it is plausible that government organizations may be more trusted for 
effective quality assurance. 
At the same time, agricultural policy in developed countries is expanding beyond 
farmer-oriented programs toward a holistic approach that benefits both the agricultural 
industry and society in general. Despite this favourable policy context for programs that 
have the potential to deliver gains to both society and the agricultural industry, to date there 
has been limited investigation regarding the appropriate role for government in the market 
for production-derived attributes in Canada.  
A coordinated quality assurance system to support the market for production-
derived attributes could address consumer desires for production-derived quality, mitigate 
credibility concerns, and satisfy government objectives for agricultural programming to 
serve the broader interests of society. This thesis will examine the appropriate role for 
private, third party, and government actors in credible quality assurance systems for 
production-derived attributes.  Concurrently, it will examine the nature of trust that 
Canadians put in various organizations providing quality assurance. 
                                                 
1
 Nelson (1970) defines goods as being comprised of two types of quality attributes, search that can be 
ascertained upon inspection, and experience that are only ascertained following consumption. Darby and 
Karni (1973) further define credence attributes as those whose quality cannot be identified even after 
consumption. 
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1.2. Background 
 
Both the European Union and the United States support producer-oriented product 
differentiation via public quality labels and public certification respectively (European 
Commission, 2006, Agricultural Marketing Service, 2007).  The EU supports official 
quality seals such as Protected Geographic Indications and Traditional Specialties 
Guaranteed, while the USDA supports the Process Verified Program. Both of these efforts 
can be seen as quality assurance systems. There has been limited government support for 
production-based product differentiation in Canada beyond the national organic standard 
introduced in 2006, though recent research priorities of Agriculture and Agri-food Canada 
signal increased interest (Zafiriou, 2007). Recently, efforts have been undertaken in Ontario 
and Quebec that focus on local production. These Canadian efforts, however, may do little 
to increase either the variety or profitability of “producer attributes” because of the 
universality of their standards and their inability to control the quantity of products that are 
marketed under their auspices. The organic standard, for example, is universal in its 
application to all products meeting the standard. The process and consequences of 
standardization are explored further in the next chapter.   
While gross producer incomes may be higher because of the price premiums 
accompanying the organic standard, in the absence of a mechanism for producers to attain 
some degree of market/pricing power via product differentiation, producers will not be able 
to maintain higher net returns in the long-term
2
.  This thesis defines universal standards as 
those that are constant across products and firms within a country. For example, the 
national organic standard delivers one type of production system that is reasonably well-
                                                 
2
 Minimum quality standards like the organic standard restrict quantity by allowing only those products that 
meet the standard to be certified, however this is not restrictive enough to prevent firms from entering the 
organic market until the point where super normal profits are eroded.  
4 
 
known to consumers and represents the same standard on all products using it. A universal 
standard applicable across products and firms provides an effective quality signal to 
consumers if appropriately managed. However it is conceivable that agricultural producers, 
food industry firms and heterogeneous consumers may obtain more utility from a variety of 
production systems/standards if they were credible – depending on the costs associated with 
the standards. If a variety of standards increases segregation costs for the conventional 
product, however, consumers purchasing the conventional product may lose (Fulton and 
Giannakas, 2004). 
The recent success of the well-known international natural and organic food retailer 
Whole Foods Markets in entering the Canadian market suggests that the demand for 
production-derived quality extends beyond organic products. Multiple organizations, 
working with their own unique standards, are currently providing quality assurances for 
production-derived quality in Canada. Whole Foods Markets, along with firms and non-
profit organizations such as Local Foods Plus and Food Alliance, have created their own 
standards to define production derived quality for a variety of foods. There has been little 
research regarding how these multiple standards and quality assurance systems affect the 
credibility of production-derived claims and consumer demand for production-derived 
attributes. It is unclear how consumers’ trust in different types of organizations influences 
these organizations’ abilities to signal production-derived quality.  
1.3. Objective 
 
This thesis will examine the appropriate role for private, third party, and 
government actors in verifying production-derived quality. It will examine how consumer 
trust in an organization affects its ability to communicate production-derived attributes. 
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Moreover, it will determine if the type of organization assuring a particular production-
derived attribute affects the utility gained by consumers from that attribute. The strength 
and nature of Canadian consumers’ trust in government, food retailers, third party certifiers, 
farmers, supermarkets, and food processors is examined to determine how quality 
assurance from different types of organizations can influence the credibility of production-
derived claims.   
1.4. Outline 
This thesis is structured as follows. First, chapter two lays out the theoretic 
groundwork necessary to investigate the problem at hand. Drawing on literature from 
psychology, business, economics and sociology, a working conceptual model is developed 
to contextualize the interrelationships of interest to the investigation. Second, chapter three 
explores the current market conditions for production attributes. Analysis of semi-
structured interviews with various members of supply chains for production-derived quality 
reveals factors affecting quality assurance adoption.  The nature of an organization’s 
credibility and how their actions and composition affect their ability to contribute to a 
credible quality signal is explored. Third, chapter 4 outlines the methodology used for a 
Canadian consumer survey examining the trustworthiness of organizations in 
communicating production attributes. Chapter 5 reports the results of the consumer survey 
and outlines how the verifying organization affects consumer willingness to pay for 
production attributes. Chapter 6 concludes and provides policy implications. 
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2. TRUST, QUALITY ASSURANCE, AND THE ROLE FOR GOVERNMENT 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Food markets sometimes have imperfect information between buyers and sellers. 
Taste and more intangible process attributes can be characterised as experience and 
credence attributes respectively. As a result, they are both impossible to accurately assess 
by examination at the time of purchase. Akerlof (1970) highlighted the need for some level 
of “quality assurance” in one-time purchases where quality could not be determined at 
purchase. Klein and Leffler (1981) elaborated further that reputation is key to reaching a 
market equilibrium with experience goods. Recent literature, including Caswell and 
Mojduszka (1996) and Antle (1995) emphasizes that inefficient outcomes arise in the 
presence of imperfect information when goods are comprised of credence attributes that 
cannot feasibly be known even after consumption.  
Trusted and accurate labels or brands can mitigate the problems caused by 
information asymmetry at the point of purchase. A label or brand becomes a credible signal 
to transform credence attributes into search attributes when it is sufficiently trusted. Golan, 
Kuchler and Mitchell (2001) explore the economics of food labelling with specific 
reference to the criteria for a government’s choice of mandatory or voluntary labels. 
Underlying the effectiveness of a labelling scheme is the necessity for consumers to believe 
what the labels say. Firms must also ensure that their products are representative of label or 
brand claims if they are to be effective quality signals. Thus, trusted and effective quality 
assurance systems can be seen as an integral part of communicating credence attributes to 
consumers via labels or brands. 
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2.2. Related Work 
 
Researchers have examined ways to increase the production of food using 
alternative farming methods (see Marrette 2005 for an overview). A significant amount of 
this research has been conducted based on the premise that allowing producers to capture 
rent from production-derived attributes will increase the production of food using 
alternative farming methods. This research addresses strategies for overcoming historical 
problems associated with agricultural marketing as outlined in Innes et al. (2007), namely: 
-Most farms are too small to garner the economies of scale associated with 
marketing activities 
-Individual farmers face direct competition from other farmers producing near 
perfect substitutes 
-The production of any individual farm is unlikely to be sufficiently large to satisfy 
retailers’ demands for consistency of supply and quality  
-Costs of organization are high for geographically dispersed atomistic producers 
 
Hayes et al. (2004) and Lence et al. (2007) have explored the production of 
differentiated foods by examining the welfare and market implications of various policies. 
Lence et al. examined how different policy options can enable production differentiated 
food products and how these policy options affect consumer and producer welfare.  Hayes 
et al. focussed on the implications of European and American approaches to geographic 
differentiation for producer welfare. Other research by Marette and Crespi (2003) and 
Marette et al. (1999) has examined the potential for producers of high quality products to 
capture the benefits of production-derived quality attributes by forming a stable cartel. 
They conclude that social welfare may be enhanced by a cartel that accurately 
communicates quality and limits quantity if the costs of labelling are high. Hence, previous 
research suggests that there are policy options to encourage and enable production-derived 
quality. 
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Besides the challenges posed by the structure of agriculture, the structure of the 
agri-food system inhibits the market for production-derived quality. The increasing 
physical separation of producers and consumers brought about through the global trend of 
urbanization necessitates that food is distributed and sold through complex supply chains. 
Most developed country agri-food supply chains have significant market concentration at 
the processor and retail level that also may hinder the market for production attributes 
(OECD, 2006; Bosmans, et al. 2005). Though the research in this area is limited in scope, 
evidence from existing European quality schemes such as Label Rouge in France 
(European Commission, 2006
a
) suggests that even when quality assurance schemes for 
production attributes exist, retailer and processor market power can allow significant rent 
capture and limit the benefits to both consumers and producers. The extent that retailers and 
processors facilitate or hinder the market for production-derived quality is unclear and 
appears to be case dependent. Of most relevance is that all players in the supply chain must 
have an incentive to support production-derived quality – presumably through higher prices 
and margins – and that market power will allow rent capture. Although a policy goal of 
supporting agriculture by designing policies to ensure that producers receive the benefit of 
production-derived quality has been suggested by Hayes et al. (2004), the focus of this 
thesis will be on the potential role for policy to improve consumer and social welfare more 
generally.  
Existing quality assurance schemes for production attributes such as the Geographic 
Indication system in the European Union and the collective marketing arrangements in the 
United States have largely sought to address the producer challenges outlined above.  The 
European Commission states on its website that the goals of the program are to encourage 
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diverse agricultural production, protect names from misuse, and to help consumers by 
giving them information concerning the specific character of the products (European 
Commission, 2008). The background for the EU system, however, is largely focused on 
addressing a social political agenda that assists less advantageous agricultural regions. 
Whether quality assurance schemes can accomplish this goal remains unclear because of 
the mixed success reported in the current literature (Mattas and Tsakiridou, 2007). 
It is evident that quality assurance systems have been explored on a practical level 
through policy initiatives in the EU and theoretically in the context of producer 
implications.  The remainder of this literature review will focus on explaining the relevant 
background for an exploration of the role for government in quality assurance systems 
focusing on the consumer/firm interface. 
2.3. Consumer Purchase Decision 
 
Preference for a good that maximizes a consumer’s individual utility is only 
revealed imperfectly in a purchase decision. As outlined in Figure 2.1, a consumer’s 
revealed preference for credence attributes is a combination of the normative pressures and 
discourse of society, the actual utility derived from the attribute as a function of the signal 
strength, minus the search costs imposed for the consumer to arrive at the purchase 
decision.  Neoclassical micro-economics posits that consumers maximize their utility 
subject to a budget constraint. It also assumes independent consumers have perfect 
information that they can obtain without cost.  The model outlined above, in contrast, 
includes normative pressures, or what one ought to do, and is guided by the psychology 
literature on decision theory, specifically Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of Planned Behaviour. In 
it he emphasizes that behaviour is influenced by the impact of the outcome, the perceived 
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control, and normative pressures. From an economic perspective these can be seen 
respectively as expected utility, a budget constraint, and costs imposed as a result of 
cognitive dissonance by partaking in a decision/purchase that is at odds with what one 
ought to do or ought not to do. Ajzen’s theory is important when considering how an 
organization’s involvement in quality assurance would affect the market for production-
derived quality as a respected organization would increase the normative pressure to value 
these attributes.  
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Figure 2.1. Components of revealed utility for credence attributes 
 
Figure 2.1 provides a model where individual preference derived from the expected 
utility of consumption is a function of how strongly a particular attribute is signalled to the 
consumer. Unless credence or experience attributes are signalled, consumers will not be 
Revealed Preference 
for Credence 
Attributes 
Individual Preferences 
* 
(Strength of Signal) 
Search Costs 
Heuristics- 
Price 
 Advertising 
 Retailer 
Experience 
with other 
attributes 
 
 
Brands 
Labels/Certification marks 
 
Trust in Claim 
(organization/standard) 
Normative Pressures 
Attribute 
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aware of their presence. As will be discussed in a later section, the actual presence of an 
attribute may be communicated by either a trusted and credible claim or through a 
simplified heuristic such as price, advertising, or a retailer’s reputation. The degree of 
credibility established by the trusted reputation of the organization assuring the attribute, 
combined with the rigour of the standard itself, both affect how strongly a certified label 
will signal the presence of a credence attribute. Search costs will be affected by both the 
strength and variability of signals possessed by products in the consumer’s choice set. If the 
decision choice is complex, a consumer will more likely use a heuristic to determine the 
presence of the attribute rather than evaluating their trust in the organization or the 
credibility of the standard directly. A heuristic will lessen the search costs involved in 
making the purchase decision, and signal the presence of the attribute to the consumer. The 
intricacies of how an organization or standard becomes a trusted and credible signal, and 
when a heuristic would likely be used will be examined in the following sections on choice 
complexity and search costs. Figure 2.1 shows that the strength of the signal identifying a 
credence attribute affects the decision mechanism used by the consumer to make a 
purchase. Trust and credibility associated with a particular organization or standard will 
affect quality signal strength. Additionally, the relative signal strengths of products in the 
choice set affect consumer search costs.  
2.4. Search Costs 
 
Transaction cost economics emphasizes that price is not the only cost associated 
with a purchase; often search costs are involved before purchase. Stigler (1961) first shed 
light on costs incurred by a consumer when purchasing a good. Barzel (1982) further 
clarified that the expected benefit of purchasing a product is eroded by the effort required to 
13 
 
search for that product. Traditional microeconomic theory is based on the law of one price 
such that identical goods will obtain the same price. Search cost explains price 
heterogeneity, where the same good may sell for different prices in different stores if effort 
is required for consumers to obtain pricing information. Thus, the imperfect information 
about price, and subsequently the cost to achieve more perfect information, allows price 
heterogeneity for similar goods.   
Applied to goods containing production-derived quality, a consumer’s search costs 
entail not only determining price, but also determining the good’s quality.  Determining this 
quality thus relies upon the consumer interpreting the various signals that firms use to 
communicate quality that may include brands, price, advertising, labels, etc. The decision 
cost incurred in determining quality is affected by the strength of these signals that, in the 
case of labels or brands, is contingent upon the consumer belief in or understanding of the 
label claims.  
 Even if quality signals are credible, potentially high search costs can still exist. The 
price heterogeneity referred to above involved only one parameter that is easily compared 
and understood as it is measured numerically. Quality heterogeneity, even if the quality is 
credible, can entail high search costs because it consists of many parameters that are 
measured in different units – only some of which are numeric. Simplification of this range 
of quality via some form of standards is one way that consumer search costs can be 
reduced. 
2.5. Standards 
 
Defined standards allow the classification of goods and services and serve various 
roles for consumers and producers. Most importantly, standards can reduce the transaction 
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costs incurred by consumers seeking to purchase goods with particular qualities. David 
(1987) typifies standards as broadly fitting into three categories, namely: minimum 
standards that prescribe minimum attribute levels for things such as safety and quality, 
reference standards that serve to define objects such as currencies, weights and measures, 
and finally compatibility standards that allow components from different manufacturers to 
interface effectively. Both minimum quality and reference standards are important when 
discussing food quality from production-derived attributes. 
Minimum quality standards have traditionally been a way to reduce consumer 
confusion and more effectively signal product quality to consumers.  Jones and Hudson 
(1996) argue that minimum standards truncate quality variance by eliminating those goods 
with quality lower than the minimum standard. The aggregate effect is that the lower 
quality variance results in reduced informational search costs for consumers that can 
potentially lead to welfare gains. Gardner (2003) further outlines the role that minimum 
quality standards play in the US and observes that they protect consumers from fraud, 
reward producers of high quality products and reduce the costs incurred by consumers to 
obtain information about a food’s quality. The implementation of minimum quality 
standards does not necessarily imply that products will cluster around the minimum quality 
level. Indeed firms may differentiate their products based on the qualities in excess of a 
minimum standard in a variety of ways, as shown by Kirchhoff (2000) when she examines 
the provision of environmentally friendly practices. Minimum quality standards only serve 
to ensure that products below a certain standard are not considered the same as those 
products meeting the standard. One example of this type of standard is the soon-to-be-
implemented Canadian National Standard for Organic Agriculture that will require all 
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products labelled as organic to be produced using methods specified in the standard. Firms 
may wish to use methods that go beyond the standard. 
Reference standards serve to mitigate consumer transaction costs by reducing 
misunderstandings, clumsy explanations, and wasted time occurring with communication in 
the absence of common definitions. In the same way that a Canadian dollar has been 
defined to represent 100 cents, so too may a term like “pesticide free” wheat be collectively 
defined to facilitate easy communication. The definition of a standard like pesticide free 
would mean that all firms using the term pesticide free would be carrying out the same 
practices. Consumer search costs associated with determining what exactly pesticide free 
means could be reduced with a reference standard.  Without a standard, firms could label 
wheat as pesticide free that used different practices such as: no pesticide when the crop was 
growing, no pesticides used at all, no detectable pesticide residue in the soil, or no pesticide 
used when the grain was stored. The process of defining a particular reference standard 
may arise through the natural evolution of language, collective action of private and/or 
public organizations, or public regulation. 
Standards may be introduced by firms - individually or collectively – and/or by 
public organizations such as government. For qualities easily identified by the consumer, 
firms will have incentives to sort products into standardized lots congruent with Barzel’s 
(1982) orange example. Barzel explains how a grocer will have an incentive to sort oranges 
into standardized lots to prevent consumers from exerting effort that would detract from 
their willingness to pay. Consumers can determine the quality of goods in each 
standardized group and thus assign a value to the minimum standard based on the utility 
they derive from the quality level and reduced quality variability. A complete hierarchy of 
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quality standards is also known as grading. Both grades and minimum quality standards 
similarly reduce quality variance resulting in lower consumer search costs. While minimum 
quality standards truncate the quality distribution at the lower end, a grade limits the quality 
variance at both ends. Firms may be motivated to work collectively to establish standards to 
profit from an expanded market that is not impeded by search costs. Standards may also be 
implemented via public regulation to mitigate market failure and improve social welfare. 
Leland (1979) shows that when quality is unobservable, minimum quality standards can 
remedy the type of market failure highlighted by Akerlof (1970). Quality standards will 
only deliver the benefits outlined above when they are enforced. 
For standards to be effective there must be processes in place to ensure that they are 
enforced. The orange example outlined above mostly involves characteristics easily 
determined by the consumer following consumption, such as the juiciness of the oranges. 
For credence goods, like the pesticide example, a standard implies there is a mechanism to 
ensure that the criteria represented by the standard were indeed followed. A standard 
pertaining to credence attributes thus signals some form of quality assurance that the 
product complies with the standard’s defined criteria, whether this is a minimum standard 
or a reference standard. The standard becomes part of the means to prevent goods from 
being identified by the standardized claim without conforming to the standard’s protocols 
when it is accompanied by appropriate monitoring and verification. In the absence of some 
form of quality assurance to ensure this conformity, adverse selection
3
 will mean that only 
low quality products will be offered. Ultimately, this reduces the value of the standard once 
                                                 
3
 Adverse selection means that only those firms producing product with quality lower than the standard will 
want to use it, for an illustration see Innes et al. (2007). 
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consumers begin to mistrust it
4
. The Canadian National Standard for Organic Agriculture 
and accompanying monitoring and enforcement is one example of how a defined national 
standard seeks to avoid consumer confusion and ensure that low (i.e. fake) quality products 
do not erode the value of the organic label (Weseen, 2006).  
Reference and minimum quality standards can be seen to aid both the market 
collectively and firms individually. While the organic example improves the market 
efficiency in the long-term by reducing consumer confusion, the orange example may be a 
competitive strategy by the shopkeeper to differentiate her store from competitors- i.e. by 
enabling easier and quicker shopping. Creating universal reference standards like pesticide 
free wheat or minimum quality standards like the organic standard ultimately reduces 
consumer confusion and facilitates easy recognition of particular qualities through 
standardization. The collective benefit from reducing confusion that comes with a known 
and trusted standard creates a public asset that all producers meeting the criteria can use. In 
doing so, the standard eliminates the potential for a firm to obtain a competitive advantage 
from the standard’s criteria as all firms meeting the standard are now producing similar 
quality goods. 
In contrast, a private standard that is credible, unique to a firm, and well-known 
may provide an opportunity for a competitive advantage if it commands a price premium 
and the firm can control the quantity marketed under the standard. While a standard itself 
cannot be owned as intellectual property, it does permit a point of differentiation. Of 
course, any competitive advantage would have to outweigh the consumer search costs 
implicit with a standard used by only one firm. Though universal standards can reduce 
                                                 
4
 Though an individual consumer may not know whether a specific credence attribute exists, actions like 
competitive reconnaissance, consumer watchdog groups, and media investigations could expose fraudulent 
activity over time and cause mistrust amongst consumers regarding a specific standard. 
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consumer confusion and search costs, they prevent producers from achieving a price above 
average cost for producing according to a recognized specification
5
. There is evidently a 
trade-off between the benefits of reduced confusion by a universal standard and the 
opportunity costs of creating a public good for firms already marketing similar type goods. 
Any system of standards will therefore have winners and losers. With production-derived 
attributes, universal standards may not be required to reduce confusion, just credible claims 
backed by a reputable agency. A lack of credibility for production-derived claims means 
that the uncertainty surrounding a product’s quality will increase consumer search costs and 
make consumer choices more complex.   
2.6. Choice Complexity 
 
Consider that there are similar goods with multiple claims having various levels of 
credibility. The cost in time and mental effort to discern which claim(s) to trust is similar to 
the cost entailed in physically finding the lowest price. In keeping with the spirit of Barzel 
(1982), the more complicated the purchase decision is because of competing claims, then 
the less a consumer will pay for a product containing particular production attributes. 
Uncertainty over the accuracy of product claims induced by multiple quality claims may 
not only increase search costs but may also delay or inhibit the purchase. Verbeke (2005) 
citing Cukierman (1980) outlines how uncertainty can cause consumers to seek more 
information and postpone the decision process. In cases of highly substitutable, low priced 
goods that are purchased repeatedly, however, Verbeke concludes that consumers are more 
likely not to purchase the product than to seek more information. His conclusions follow a 
consumer survey on a European beef traceability and labelling system. Applied to a 
                                                 
5
 With free entry and exit 
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collection of product claims, his conclusions mean that instead of exerting effort to discover 
the trustworthiness of the potential products, consumers may simply not purchase the 
product and instead opt for the status quo. Though the specific effects are unclear, multiple 
production-derived claims with various levels of credibility are likely to reduce consumer 
willingness to pay and may even deter purchases entirely. 
Much has been written on how choice complexity affects decision making (for a 
review see Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Conventional economic theory generally assumes 
that consumer welfare increases with choice and that producers will continue to produce 
new varieties until the marginal benefit of doing so is eroded by the marginal cost of 
differentiation. In this paradigm, consumer search costs outlined above are not included and 
thus a paradigm including consumer transaction costs would arrive at an optimal number of 
products for both consumers and producers that is lower than the neoclassical approach.  
Recent writings from Schwartz (2004) and Norwood (2006) challenge the 
conventional economic wisdom that more choice is welfare enhancing for consumers. 
Schwartz uses the psychology literature on decision choice to emphasize that too much 
choice can lead to decreased consumer utility because of the regret arising from a less than 
perfect choice and the impossibility of meeting expectations created by increased choice. 
More importantly, he reveals that too much choice may cause decision paralysis whereby 
no choice will be made in the presence of too many options.  One study that Schwartz bases 
his conclusions on is by Iyengar and Lepper (2000) where consumers faced both a large 
and small variety of displayed jams. They found that thirty percent of consumers presented 
with the small variety of jams made a purchase, whereas only three percent of consumers 
presented with the large variety made a purchase. Thus the increased variety decreased the 
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likelihood of purchase. This is similar to the situation that Verbeke referred to earlier where 
excess choice, or complexity of choice, induces inaction. For most transactions, search 
costs are more likely to impede purchases rather than prevent them.     
Faced with complex decisions, consumers must process information in an attempt to 
make a purchase decision. One tenet of transaction cost economics is that individuals are 
assumed to possess only bounded rationality and are only able to process a finite amount of 
information. To make a complex decision under uncertainty easier, consumers often rely on 
simplified criteria known as heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Verbeke (2005) 
refers to two theoretical models that explain how people make complex decisions; both are 
rooted in earlier work outlined by Slovic et al. (1977). First, Verbeke outlines Chaiken’s 
(1980) heuristic systematic model that consists of two nodes; consumers first use the 
systematic node by synthesizing available information in a rational manner, followed by the 
heuristic node whereby consumers use simple decision rules or rules of thumb to arrive at a 
decision.  Chaiken’s model means that consumer preferences are only fully rational and 
reasoned when they are not complex.   
Second, the Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion by Petty and Cacioppo 
(1986) suggests that individuals process information by both central and peripheral routes.  
Similar to Chaiken’s model, the periphery route relates to low involvement decisions where 
external cues like a trustworthy information source permits simple inferences without 
resorting to a more complex process. The central route is thus used for systematic decisions 
where multiple criteria are assessed in a more complex and complete manner. Many 
external cues may be used as heuristics when consumers are faced with claims relating to 
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production attributes. External cues may be thought of as a signal to the consumer of the 
characteristic of a good.  
2.7. Signalling 
 
Central to the discussion of decision-simplifying mechanisms is consumer use of 
cues or signals to determine the quality of a good prior to purchase. Production-derived 
attributes are often credence attributes that involve large information asymmetries; without 
some sort of signal consumers cannot determine the presence of these attributes. Accurately 
signalling product attributes – thereby turning credence attributes into search attributes – 
can allow consumers to purchase those attributes that maximize their utility; firms will 
subsequently be encouraged to produce these attributes.  
The economics literature includes many examples of mechanisms for firms to signal 
specific experience and credence qualities to consumers. Warranties, money-back 
guarantees, insurance excesses, product standardization, investments in branding, 
advertising, sunk costs, and third party certification are all signalling approaches that firms 
may use (Riley, 2001). Specific theoretical contributions for signals as heuristics for 
experience attributes include the use of advertising (Nichols, 1998), price (Bagwell and 
Riorden, 1991) and reputation (Shapiro, 1982). While signalling is straightforward with 
repeat purchases of experience attributes where consumers discover the accuracy of the 
signal by experiencing the quality upon consumption, credence attributes are more difficult 
to accurately signal because consumers may never discover if the purchased attribute 
actually was present. The definition of a credence attribute implies that the cost to discover 
it is prohibitive for the individual purchaser, though investigations by consumer watchdog 
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groups, the media, and competitive espionage may reveal if a firm’s credence signals are 
accurate. 
The interesting element of signalling credence attributes is that it is always 
somewhat incomplete. Cole and Harris (2003) advance the idea that firms can essentially 
signal credence attributes most effectively through third party certification and reputation. 
They refer to McCluskey’s (2000) game theoretic approach to organic certification that 
highlights how the difference in production costs, the profit in producing a high quality 
good, and the discount rate all affect the likelihood that firms will attempt to cheat the 
certification system by marketing low quality products as high quality products. A similar 
approach may be applied to both the certifier and auditor to determine if they will have 
sufficient incentives to accurately signal credence attributes. Reputation as a means to 
accurately signal credence attributes is similar to experience attributes. By investing 
significantly in sunk costs like advertising, infrastructure, and branding exercises based on 
accurately supplying credence attributes, a firm will naturally have an incentive to reduce 
the risk of eroding these assets by providing the credence attributes claimed. Retailers like 
Whole Foods
6
 specializing in production-derived attributes have a much higher incentive to 
deliver on these attributes than retailers who have made no sunk investments in their 
reputations to provide these credence attributes. Thus both third party certification and 
reputation can provide accurate signals for credence attributes if firm incentives are 
sufficient and there exists a risk of exposing false claims. 
                                                 
6
 Whole Foods Markets is the world’s largest retailer of natural and organic foods with stores in North 
America and the United Kingdom. They have invested heavily into formulating production standards for a 
wide range of food and differentiate themselves based on the production derived quality of the food they sell. 
Their reputation that has accumulated through marketing and customer experiences depends on consumers 
believing that their products are indeed natural and organic. 
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 Another example of how firms may signal credence attributes is modelled by 
Grolleau and Caswell (2006) who argue that product performance consistent with 
purveyor’s claims relating to search and experience attributes leads to consumer confidence 
in additional credence claims made by those same sellers. There has been no empirical 
evidence to support their model and it is unclear whether accurate claims of search and 
experience attributes can mitigate information asymmetry in the case of production-derived 
attributes. 
2.8. Trust and Credibility 
 
Signalling a credence attribute using a brand/label requires the consumer to trust 
that it accurately represents the good’s characteristics. In the case of brands, credibility is 
established via the consumer’s brand experience, leading to the accumulation of brand 
equity (Keller, 1993). Consumers must be both exposed to what the brand represents and 
have positive experiences to see it as a credible signal representing credence attributes, 
similar to the model of Grolleau and Caswell (2006). Relying on a quality assurance system 
to establish the credibility of credence claims similarly depends on consumer awareness of 
the underlying standards and consumer trust in the organization making the certification. A 
quality assurance system only becomes a credible mechanism to transform credence 
attributes into search attributes when it is adequately trusted. Establishing consumer trust in 
the credibility of a production claim can thus be seen as necessary for consumers to 
purchase production-derived attributes.  
In general terms, Rousseau et al. (1998) define trust as “the intention to accept 
vulnerability based upon the behaviour of positive expectations of the intentions of or 
behaviour of another” (p. 395). In the case of production-derived credence attributes, trust 
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means that the consumer expects the purveyor of the product to accurately represent the 
product and accepts the vulnerability that they do not. Poortinga and Pidgeon (2003) review 
past research relating to the dimensionality of trust and distil that empirical studies 
generally reveal two key dimensions relating to trust in risk management.  They highlight 
that both trustworthiness and competence are key in evaluating citizens’ trust in 
institutions. Trustworthiness reflects emotional/affective beliefs about institutional 
behaviour and motivations, whereas competence represents perceptions pertaining to the 
ability of the organization to do its job. Trustworthiness includes such elements as 
openness, reliability, integrity, credibility, fairness, and caring. Metlay (1999), in his study 
on the US Department of Energy, finds that all of these elements reveal one general factor 
that he terms “affective elements” that relate to how people perceive the institution. Not all 
research, however, arrives at the same two-dimensional view of trust. Frewer et al. (1996), 
for example, conclude that trust in information sources for food related hazards is linked to 
perceptions of accuracy, knowledge and concern with public welfare. Though the empirical 
studies do not always produce two distinct factors congruent with trustworthiness and 
competence, the underlying constructs appear to be similar and support the idea that 
individuals trust organizations whose motivations appear most similar to their own and 
those organizations whose capacities appear most competent.  
Trust related to specific organizations as information providers on food related risks 
has been examined in the literature. In a UK study, Frewer et al. (1996) examine consumer 
trust in different organizations in response to several food-related risks including pesticide 
residue. Their study evaluates distrust in supermarkets compared to the food industry for 
information related to pesticide residues and genetic engineering, among others. They find 
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that respondents have significantly more distrust in supermarkets as an information source 
than in the food industry, though they do not define food industry. The survey was 
undertaken in the United Kingdom in 1995 and thus may not be directly applicable to 
Canada today. They conclude that industry was only moderately trusted as they are 
expected to be more apt to provide information to protect their own interests than out of 
concern for public welfare. The ability for government to be a trusted organization to 
provide information – i.e. signal credence attributes – thus partly depends upon how closely 
aligned the motivations of governments are with the public welfare.   
Another study examining who the public trusts in relation to genetically modified 
food was carried out in the US by Lang and Hallman (2005). Using a four dimensional trust 
construct they find that consumer and environmental advocacy organizations obtain high 
trust scores ahead of farmers, the federal government, grocery stores, and industry 
respectively. Recent research commissioned by Agriculture and Agri-food Canada (Ipsos 
Reid, 2006) suggests that Canadians place a high degree of trust in the federal government 
as an information source. Anecdotally, this would be consistent with the characterization of 
Canadians’ holding the general view that the government is a benevolent organization 
whose interests closely align with its citizens.  
Consumers’ trust in organizations is important as it is directly related to the 
credibility associated with the organization’s activities. The credibility of credence claims 
resulting from a quality assurance system is thus established by the creation of trust in the 
system itself and trust in the organization behind the system. The credibility associated with 
an information source also has significant impacts on an individual’s decision process. A 
highly credible source can act as an information cue or heuristic to simplify a decision 
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process (Trumbo and McComas, 2003). Thus, the involvement of a more credible and 
trusted institution – government instead of private – can simplify the decision process for 
consumers who possess bounded rationality by avoiding potential decision paralysis or 
sorting costs. The USDA Process Verified program is one such example where a seal from 
a trusted organization signals to consumers that firms have followed their own private 
production standards. Trust, or rather the degree of trust that consumers have in 
organizations and their processes, is critical for a quality assurance system to effectively 
signal producer-derived attributes; consumers need to trust product/brand claims to be 
willing to pay for the respective attributes and more trusted institutions can mitigate 
consumer search costs. 
2.9. The Role for Government 
 
Approaching policy challenges – i.e. what is the role for government in quality 
assurance systems – from an economic perspective inevitably raises the questions of what 
market failures are occurring and subsequently the most efficient solutions to address them. 
Cole and Harris (2003) outline the typical causes of market failure including public goods, 
externalities, imperfect competition, and asymmetric information. The economic rationale 
to involve government in a quality assurance system for credence attributes relates to both 
imperfect competition and asymmetric information. Imperfect competition allows firms to 
charge prices higher than average cost that can reduce social welfare. Asymmetric 
information means that consumers are not able to determine the exact characteristics of a 
good, resulting in a sub-optimal consumption bundle that may reduce or eliminate the 
market for certain goods whose quality is difficult to ascertain. 
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Government involvement in the market for credence attributes may reduce the 
impacts of adverse selection by reducing information asymmetries. Zago and Pick (2004), 
for example, discuss the role for government in relation to geographic indications, while 
Harris and Cole (2003) similarly discuss how government can aid the market for eco-
labelled goods by providing an accurate measurement of environmental friendliness. 
Market intervention by government to correct distortions caused by asymmetric 
information can improve social welfare if the costs imposed are outweighed by benefits 
achieved. 
Credence attributes, and the difficulty involved in determining their presence, can 
create large monitoring costs for firms in the supply chain. Conflicting incentives for 
different members of the supply chain may lead a firm to misrepresent the characteristics of 
a credence good to another firm. For example, a producer will have an incentive to market 
regular produce as organic produce to reduce the costs if they have little fear of being 
caught. For a firm to ensure goods they purchase actually contain the credence attributes 
they purport to necessitates monitoring the actions of a supplying firm to ensure accuracy. 
Credence attributes, by definition, are expensive to monitor/identify and in the case of 
production attributes necessitate a process-based quality assurance system. Transaction cost 
economics (Williamson, 1981) suggests that as the monitoring costs to assure quality 
increase, firms are more likely to increase their coordination so that incentives for each firm 
are more congruent.  
As firms increase their coordination to the point of integration, the number of firms 
in a given market may decline to the point where the remaining firms will possess a degree 
of market power. Ménard and Valceschini (2005) discuss the relevance of transaction cost 
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economics to the emerging organizational structures in European supply chains.  
Transaction costs affect the organization of supply chains and this in turn can affect the 
ability of various players to capture rents. Vetter and Karantininis (2002) examine the 
implications of assuring credence attributes on the transaction costs of the firms involved.  
They note that the moral hazard implicit in credence attributes favours higher monitoring 
costs and thus a propensity for vertical integration when credence attributes are assured.  
Importantly, they identify that in cases where public certification of credence attributes is 
more trustworthy, social welfare may improve if public involvement mitigates the need for 
vertical integration.  The authors highlight the relationship between transaction costs, 
vertical integration, society’s trust in private versus public certification and the resulting 
social welfare. Extending their conclusions to production-derived quality, government may 
have a role in the market for production attributes to mitigate the effects of imperfect 
competition caused by high transaction costs.        
Understanding the appropriate role for government in the market for credence 
attributes hinges not only on providing effective quality signals and mitigating imperfect 
competition, but also includes considering the ancillary effects on normative social 
pressures and consumer search costs. Previously, the potential for government involvement 
in a quality assurance system for producer-derived attributes has been discussed in relation 
to market efficiency to overcome problems of information asymmetry, sorting costs, and 
equity issues surrounding the distribution of rents.  An additional role that governments 
play is in affecting the public discourse surrounding food quality and safety.  Morris and 
Young (2000) cite Marsden and Arce (1995) and Marsden et al. (1997) when they 
conceptualize food quality as, 
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a fluid and socially constructed concept which is constantly created 
and recreated through the discourses and actions of key actors with 
in the agro-food system.(p. 104) 
 
The European Union implemented mandatory organic standards in 1991, the U.S. 
did the same in 2002. Canada is currently phasing in a mandatory national organic standard 
to be fully implemented by late 2008.  The definition of food quality above suggests that 
the relatively slow response of the Canadian Government to implement mandatory 
standards to contribute to the integrity of organic production could be affecting the way in 
which consumers conceptualize quality. Current government policy and communication 
touts all Canadian food as being of high quality because of regulations pertaining to food 
safety.
7
  While food safety is endorsed as a quality by government, their apparent 
reluctance regarding production attributes may not encourage consumers to think of quality 
as including the way in which the food was produced.  
 Public discourse leads to a collective normative belief about what one ought or 
ought not to do/think. Recall from Figure 1 that these normative beliefs affect a consumer’s 
revealed preference for a production-derived credence attribute. Government involvement 
in a quality assurance scheme can be viewed as an endorsement of producer-derived quality 
– an endorsement that presumably positively influences the normative view of production-
derived quality given the high levels of trust outlined previously. Ajzen’s model (1991) 
predicts that government involvement has the potential to affect consumers not only by 
mitigating problems caused by information asymmetry and imperfect competition but also 
                                                 
7
 Government actions not only influence societal discourse, but also are influenced by interest groups and 
society in general. For example, interest groups such as pesticide companies may wish to discourage 
alternative production methods. Deciphering which action most drives the public discourse around food 
quality is difficult.  
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more broadly by affecting the demand for production attributes via influencing normative 
beliefs. 
Potential mechanisms to alleviate credibility and complexity problems from a 
government perspective vary in degree of market interference. Given that labelling laws 
currently dictate that all claims must be accurate, claims lacking credibility could 
theoretically be eliminated by merely enforcing current laws. Without undertaking any new 
approaches, the simplest way to address credibility issues may be to increase enforcement 
activities to the point where the public begins to trust that existing laws are being followed. 
Further involvement could include defining standards, supporting private or third party 
certification via information campaigns that clarify a system of set standards, certification 
of products to a standard, accrediting certifiers, and finally undertaking the whole process 
from information dissemination to product certification. Costs - both opportunity and 
administrative - increase in proportion to the extent of government involvement. Benefits 
could also increase accordingly if consumers see government as more trusted than other 
market players, as previous research has suggested. Meat grading provides an example 
where government is heavily involved in the delivery of quality assurance.  
2.10. Grades: A Precedence of Government Involvement 
 
Formalized government grading systems exist for many agricultural products in 
both Canada and US. This provides an example of government involvement to mitigate 
information asymmetry and make it easier for consumers to identify quality in food 
markets. Dating to the 1920s, grading systems for beef and pork carcasses evolved to “be 
suitable as a basis of settlement to the producer and as a means of indicating meat quality to 
the consumer” (Maybee, 1955: p.6). In other words they mitigated the problem of 
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information asymmetry for meat quality – experience attributes in particular – and provided 
a consistent signal to make quality identification easier for consumer. 
The rationale for government involvement in meat grading during the early 20
th
 
century is unclear. Distrust of meat packing companies by both producers and consumers 
referred to by Kinsman et al. (1994) may be part of the reason. General industry disarray, 
the challenges in exporting inconsistent quality bacon, and large number of processing 
plants referred to by the Maybee (1955) might also have led to government involvement to 
overcome collective action problems. Both sources frame the involvement of government 
arising at the bequest of producers or industry coalitions consisting of producers, 
processors, and retail/institutional customers. Government involvement arose from the 
demands of those involved for a coordinating body capable of bridging the demands of 
multiple stakeholders. 
There are two important differences between the existing meat grading system and 
production-derived quality discussed in this thesis is the type of quality characteristics 
signaled. First, the quality characteristics signaled by the grading system were widely 
desired, e.g. tender beef, whereas interest in production-derived food quality is more 
limited and arguably not universal. Not everyone will value pesticide-free production for 
example. Second, given the revelation by Ferrier and Lamb (2007) that the grading system 
has effectively commoditized the meat trade and limited the provision of quality elements 
not included in the grading system, promoting the expansion of the federal grading systems 
to include production-derived quality seems counter to raison d’etre of production-derived 
food quality. It is clear however that government involvement in grading has created a 
simplified, trusted, and uniform quality signal for meat quality. In many ways, this 
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responds to the challenges outlined in this chapter, though defining and fixing a hierarchy 
of production-derived food quality is neither necessary nor desired. Thus, the simplicity 
that comes with grade induced commoditization is desired, but not at the expense of quality 
exclusivity for those attributes that will inevitably be excluded from a hierarchical grading 
systems.  
2.11. Conclusions 
 
Government involvement in the market for production-derived attributes has the 
potential to influence three key areas affecting revealed consumer demand for these 
attributes, namely: normative social pressures, consumer search costs, and the strength of 
signals for these attributes. Stemming from these areas are two focal points where market 
inefficiencies may arise with production-derived attributes. The appropriate role for a 
particular organization to assure production-derived quality in Canada from an economic 
perspective must be evaluated in reference to these concerns. Both credibility and 
complexity emerge as focal points for potential market enhancement – defined as higher 
prices or a greater aggregate volume of production attributes sold.  
Credibility relates to consumers’ beliefs in the accuracy of attribute signalling 
exhibited through labels, point of purchase material, advertising claims and brand promise. 
If doubt exists as to whether a product actually contains the production attributes that it 
purports, then logically those who do not view the signal as credible will not be willing to 
pay for the respective attribute. Complexity involves both credibility of the product claims 
and the content of the claims themselves. Purchase decisions are made more complex if the 
choice set contains many options, there are small differences between products, and if 
information is incomplete or difficult to understand. The consumer’s decision is thus 
33 
 
confounded if the credibility of production attributes is questionable. In addition, multiple 
standards created by multiple different actors make the purchase decision difficult.  
 Multiple mechanisms exist for a firm to mitigate both the credibility and complexity 
challenges. Branding and advertising that create a reputation, and third party certification 
all serve as mechanisms for private firms to signal production attributes more clearly. 
Individual firms have an incentive to improve the credibility of their products and also 
make the consumer’s purchase decision as simple as possible as both will result in a higher 
demand for the firm’s product. This can be achieved by catering to the simplified heuristic 
decision-making process of the consumer via a strong brand or reputation.  
The challenge from a social perspective is that firms’ motivations to differentiate 
their products via production attributes may confound the consumer with a variety of 
attribute bundles that are all just slightly different. The utility gained by consumers from a 
large variety of standards may also outweigh the disutility caused by choice complexity if 
all standards were equally credible. Creating universal reference or minimum quality 
standards used across firms and products can reduce consumer confusion although it 
hinders the product differentiation desired by firms. Thus potential gains from a social 
perspective may be reached via some form of coordination that allows for a variety of 
standards but ensures that they are consistently credible.  
The credibility of a quality claim is dependent upon the credibility of both the 
quality assurance system and the organization making the claim. The amount of trust that 
people put in a particular organization is at least partially contingent on the type of 
organization it is. In Canada, where citizens generally have a benevolent and trusting view 
of government, it is reasonable to hypothesize that government may have a role in 
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coordinating quality assurance for production-derived attributes. Potential mechanisms to 
alleviate credibility and complexity problems from a government perspective vary in 
degree of market interference.  
Assessing consumer trust in current labelling regimes and government seems a 
necessary point of departure. Thus the empirical portions of this thesis seek to determine if 
market impediments for production attributes exist because of either credibility or 
complexity issues and what role government can best play to improve market efficiency. 
Although issues such as market concentration, support of agriculture, and affecting the 
normative social value of production-derived attributes more generally have all been 
suggested as a consequence of government involvement in similar schemes, they will not 
be addressed by the empirical portion of this project.   
The following section will explore the current market conditions for production-
derived attributes to more fully understand how the concepts highlighted in the preceding 
review of the literature impact consumer choices. It will focus on the mechanisms that 
firms use to signal production-derived attributes, the importance of quality assurance 
systems, and the role for different organizations in the market for these attributes.    
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3. EXPLORING CURRENT MARKET CONDITIONS FOR PRODUCTION-DERIVED 
ATTRIBUTES -INTERVIEWS WITH INDUSTRY REPRESENTATIVES 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter reports on a series of semi-structured interviews with industry 
representatives in Canada and the US that were undertaken to better understand how 
consumers interpret signals identifying production attributes. The analysis of industry 
interviews assesses how prevalent the concepts explored in the previous chapter are in the 
current market. It reveals how firms interpret and describe the factors making a firm 
credible for quality assurance so as to inform the survey design in the following chapter. 
Throughout the interviews it was evident that farming methods that differ from 
conventional methods are inevitably compared to the term organic - a word that has come 
to represent a certain set of agricultural practices. Whereas the term organic was at one time 
defined in reference to conventional foods, so too is the current evolution of farming 
methods frequently defined in reference to organic. One could take many points of 
departure from this, but for this thesis it suffices to note that an agreed upon standard has 
implications beyond quality assurance strategies and can have significant impacts on the 
perceptions of alternative farming methods. 
This chapter explores the factors that drive and inhibit the standardization of 
different forms of alternative farming methods revealed through interviews with industry 
representatives currently selling, certifying, and distributing products from these methods. 
Firstly it elucidates the extent that both credibility and complexity impact, or have the 
potential to impact, the market for production attributes. Secondly, the interviews gauge 
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both the nature of what makes a firm’s signal credible to consumers – the trustworthiness of 
it – and consequently participants’ interpretation of how credible different types of 
organizations are –  i.e. private, third-party, and government. The interviews were meant to 
be qualitative in nature, and thus the themes are more important than, for example, how the 
respondents ranked the credibility of particular organizational types.   
3.2. Methods 
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with industry representatives to explore 
the concepts examined in the literature review and gain a more complete understanding of 
current marketplace conditions for production-derived attributes. Format and technique for 
the interviews and analysis were based on the work by Arksey and Knight (1999). A semi-
structured interview format allowed consistency in questions across interviewees. This 
format assisted analysis and permitted follow-up questions to explore participants’ 
responses more thoroughly. 
Participants were selected from internet searches based on their employment with 
firms that are currently engaged in the market for production-derived attributes apart from 
organic. Firms dealing only with organic methods were avoided so as to explore the market 
environment for production-derived quality in the absence of legislated standards, 
certification, and labelling. The sample included four agricultural producers, two certifiers 
and a distributor. Three participants were from Canada and four were from the United 
States. A total of eleven potential respondents were contacted though only seven agreed to 
participate; the others did not respond to repeated requests. Participants represented firms 
ranging in product, size and scope; a complete description of the participants can be found 
in Appendix A. Although the focus of this thesis is on the role for government in Canadian 
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quality assurance, interview candidates were both American and Canadian. This was done 
for two reasons: the market for production attributes is more prevalent and further 
developed in the US, and factors affecting signalling and consumers are presumed to be 
similar in each country.  
The open ended questions used for the interviews were devised from the themes 
explored in the literature review and focused on the process of communicating production-
derived attributes and the credibility of quality assurance undertaken by different types of 
organizations. Questions were adapted slightly to suit the type of firm that a participant 
represented (i.e. producer, certifier, or distributor). A sample list of questions can be found 
in Appendix B.  
Prior to contacting participants, approval from the University of Saskatchewan 
Behavioural Research Ethics Board was obtained on March 11, 2008. Participants were 
first contacted by e-mail and invited to participate in the research study. The questions for 
the interview and an information sheet outlining their rights as a participant were attached 
to the e-mail. Interviews took between 20 and 40 minutes and were carried out over the 
telephone, with the exception of Melanie Boldt from Pine View Farms whom the researcher 
was able to visit personally. All interviews were recorded electronically and subsequently 
transcribed.  
Following participants’ approval of the written transcripts, interviews were analyzed 
and coded by the researcher to identify common themes. Themes reflected the focus areas 
of communication and credibility and were selected based upon the literature review and 
common themes that arose across the interviews. The major themes are discussed in the 
subsequent pages and included, brand, reputation, desire for information, standard based 
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confusion, and proprietary standards, to name a few. One hundred forty one passages of 
interest on the written transcripts were highlighted, assigned a theme and inputted into an 
Excel spreadsheet to assist in analysis. 
3.3. Motivations Driving Demand for Alternative Farming Methods  
 
Consumer utility attained from the presence of production-derived attributes 
ultimately motivates firms to supply these attributes. While the focus of the interviews was 
not on the characteristics of consumers interested in production-derived attributes per se, 
several consistent themes emerged that frame the discussion of quality assurance generally. 
Uniqueness, desire for information, and health were all key interests driving the demand for 
products from alternative farming methods. 
First, consumer interest in alternative production methods seemed to be primarily 
motivated by the uniqueness and prestige associated with these products. This concept was 
referred to by four of seven interviewees and suggests that both consumers and retailers 
place more value in certification and production-derived attributes because they are chic or 
unique. Christoph Weder from Prairie Heritage Beef, that produces naturally raised beef, 
expressed this desire to provide a luxury product by saying, “we want to be a Cadillac 
program”. The Cadillac brand represents both a chic and elite status limited to those who 
can afford it. In line with this idea of offering a cutting edge product, he outlined how the 
focus of their program has changed over time to reflect changing consumer trends. In the 
past they promoted their meat as being free of antibiotics or hormones whereas now they 
highlight attributes like environmental stewardship and fair trade in agriculture. For Weder, 
the changes ensured that their product was unique and met current consumer tastes.   
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Similarly, Rod MacRae of Local Food Plus in Toronto, a non-profit organization 
that certifies local and sustainable agriculture, identified that public institutions like 
universities value the “cachet” that “adds value to the student experience” by reinforcing 
that students are attending an innovative institution. Clearly institutions also want to be 
seen as being consistent with current trends and differentiated from their competitors. From 
the retailer’s perspective this desire to be different was reflected in the desire for unique 
point of sale materials to communicate what sustainability represents. Roberta Anderson 
from Food Alliance, a non-profit organization from Oregon certifying sustainability, 
stressed how retailers wanted information that they could customize rather than generic 
material that their competitors would also use. For all four of the interviewees that touched 
on this theme, certifying alternative farming methods was an important component of 
uniqueness and appearing chic. 
 The second demand driver for alternative farming methods was less prevalent than 
the concept of uniqueness. Health consciousness figures prominently in the current 
discourse surrounding food but was not focused on in the interviews. Tracy Miedema from 
Stahlbush Island Farms, a natural and organic farm and processor, notably described their 
customers as, “owners of their health … that take control of their health through the foods 
they eat”. Evidently, concern about health is linked to but was not shown to be a major 
demand driver of foods from alternative farming methods in this sample.  
 Lastly, consumer interest in knowing more about their food was a common 
characteristic that supported efforts to produce food using alternative farming methods. 
This theme coded five times over the interviews and was mentioned by four of seven 
participants. John Raiche from United Natural Foods, the largest wholesaler of natural and 
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organic foods in the United States, put it succinctly by saying, “they want to know about 
where their food comes from and how it is produced”. This same sentiment was similarly 
expressed by the other three respondents. Noticeably, participants acknowledged that 
obtaining this information was not costless and that consumers interested in knowing more 
about how their food was produced were willing to make extra efforts to obtain this 
information. For producers and certifiers selling to customers far away this meant that they 
would need to access a website or be able to contact them via telephone, while for 
producers selling primarily into the local market this quite often meant visiting the farm. 
Efforts required to obtain information about a product from alternative farming 
methods or to obtain the product itself can be considered akin to consumer search costs 
outlined in the literature review. The theme of search costs coded eight times over all of the 
interviews and was mentioned by four participants. Melanie Boldt from Pine View Farms, a 
farm marketing natural meat in the greater Saskatoon area, said that coming to the farm is 
for those consumers who are “prepared to take the extra step.” From this statement and the 
frequency that search costs coded, it is evident that consumers must care enough – i.e. be 
willing to expend enough energy searching for the product and information about it – to 
purchase food from alternative farming methods. While some consumers may value the trip 
to the farm as part of the production-derived quality experience, the costs involved with 
frequent trips required to purchase a staple food would likely overwhelm this benefit over 
time. Given the theoretical framework outlined in the first chapter, the prevalence of search 
costs suggests that more consumers would be interested in purchasing this type of food if 
the search costs were reduced.   
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The motivations for consumers to be interested in alternative farming methods are 
important as they have implications for the long-term costs and benefits of universal 
standards and certification in general. This will be discussed in more detail at the end of the 
chapter. Given that the raison d’etre for alternative agricultural practices for consumers, 
retailers, and certifiers can be encapsulated by the themes uniqueness, health and desire for 
information, the next question revolves around motivations for supply chain members to 
endorse quality assurance programs for such attributes.  
3.4. Drivers of Quality Assurance, Certification and Standards 
 
Consistent with expectations, the forces fostering an organized system of quality 
assurance based on elements of standards, certification, and coordination follow from the 
those influencing consumer interest in food from alternative farming methods. Competitive 
motivations of firms wishing to be seen as innovative and chic were one aspect that 
supported quality assurance initiatives in the interviews. Broader market level concerns to 
mitigate credibility problems
8
 and prohibitive search costs were also important in driving 
elements of quality assurance. Whereas firms are driven to satisfy consumer demand for 
unique, healthy and informed food choices they turn to quality assurance systems to enable 
them to deliver these attributes while concurrently positioning themselves as market 
leaders. 
 Quality assurance may be viewed in a hierarchical framework where standards and 
protocols lead to certification and finally to universal standards within countries and 
harmonization across countries. In other words, delivering attributes to consumers means 
that firms must first define these attributes internally, provide some proof they actually 
                                                 
8
 It is unclear if consumers who value production-derived quality for their chic/unique qualities would be 
concerned if the attributes were not actually present. 
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exist, and then align them with similar practices of other firms to buttress the 
meaningfulness of the definition in the minds of consumers. While this seemingly linear 
process is logical, the motivation to standardize is also likely to be negatively influenced by 
the desire of firms to uphold a chic image and maintain a unique competitive advantage 
over other firms. Put simply, quality assurance undertaken by firms must balance consumer 
desires for uniqueness while maintaining sufficient credibility to maintain consumer 
confidence.  
It was evident throughout the interviews that firms will undertake various forms of 
quality assurance that advance their interests. First, firms may see their own system of 
quality assurance as a competitive advantage if it is superior to existing external programs. 
Raiche from United Natural Foods refers to one supplier who said, “I'm going to go out and 
develop my own logo because my requirements are more stringent than TransFair
9”. 
Second, producers may be driven to keep up with the market as Raiche stated, “retailers are 
telling us that it is very important to understand how products are produced and what 
manufacturers stand for, because that does impact what brands they are putting on their 
shelves”. Third, firms may also be driven by the desire to stay ahead of consumer demand 
when they see a rising desire for more credibility in the future (Food Alliance, Prairie 
Heritage Beef). Weder of Prairie Heritage Beef noted specifically that third party 
certification was a competitive advantage in ensuring access to retail marketing channels, a 
theme echoed by Miedema (Stahlbush Island Farms) and Raiche (United Natural Foods). 
The firms interviewed generally referred to quality assurance systems as minimum quality 
levels upon which to add their own specific quality attributes, providing further evidence of 
their desire to differentiate their products from those of their competitors. 
                                                 
9
 TransFair is an international certifier of fairly traded products 
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The motivations for firms to adopt quality assurance mechanisms that were 
exhibited in the interviews are consistent with those revealed in the literature review. 
Proactive implementation to stave off government regulation to prevent negative 
externalities associated with unsafe food as outlined by Hobbs et al. (2002), however, was 
not evident. It is plausible that the negative externalities arising from incredible labels for 
production-derived quality are not of great concern to government and market actors do not 
see a strong likelihood of government intervention in these markets in the near future. 
MacRae (Local Food Plus) lent support to this idea when he emphasized that governments 
are not interested in such regulation if they can collaborate with industry partners like non-
profit organizations that have similar goals. It could also be that firms could gain a 
competitive advantage by pre-empting regulation and establishing their own standards. 
McCluskey (2006) shows in her examination of the increasing prevalence of public/private 
cooperation for food safety and quality assurance systems that firms may gain a 
competitive advantage in this situation. She shows that firms may obtain a competitive 
advantage by pre-empting regulation and establishing their own standards. It is not 
surprising that firms implement varying degrees of quality assurance that advance their 
competitive position in the marketplace, but it is notable that this competitive positioning 
includes mitigating search costs for their consumers.   
 Heuristics that serve to simplify the consumer’s purchase decision were identified 
through the industry interviews as one way that certification seals improve the 
communication of production attributes. Anderson of Food Alliance confirmed this 
hypothesis while outlining the benefits of Food Alliance certification. She said that the, 
“consumer is looking for cues they have made a good choice” and that “a certification seal 
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accomplishes that.” Anderson went on to say that consumers do not understand the 
differences between competing products, and implied that a certification seal, even if they 
do not know what is behind it, will serve as a quality signal. Research by Sawyer et al. 
(2007) on consumer preferences for organic standards similarly revealed that consumers’ 
preferences can differ between standards and the criteria that compose them. They found 
that consumers often preferred their domestic standard but rated the criteria from another 
country’s standard higher.  
For Anderson, certification under a harmonized standard provided a benefit to firms 
because it simplified the communication of a quality attribute. It is evident from her 
comments that a certification seal may not be communicating a quality attribute specifically 
but may be seen as communicating quality or values more generally. It may not be 
necessary that consumers understand what a certification seal represents for it to signal 
quality if the seal is promoted as broadly representing high quality or their personal values. 
Either interpretation can be seen as way to mitigate the search cost for a consumer to 
purchase a food with production-derived quality. 
Certification that involved a universal standard was also a means to reduce the 
transaction costs for a food distributor. Raiche from United Natural Foods showed his 
preference for harmonization and certification by saying, "we don’t communicate natural, 
there is no definition, no certification, and no watchdogs.” He went on to say that, “organic 
is pretty easy, there's a certification process, it's pretty black and white.” Thus for Raiche, 
and United Natural Foods in their role as a food distributor handling approximately 40 000 
products, there was great value in the simplicity of a universal standard with certification. 
Whereas certification reduced search costs for consumers in the minds of the certification 
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agency, it seemed to reduce the costs of complexity and risk of products of dubious quality 
in the mind of a distributor. 
 The interviews showed that different levels of quality assurance have different 
motivators. Minimum quality standards emerged as the basis for product differentiation, 
whether they were internally generated or obtained from an external source. Universal 
minimum quality standards – used across products and firms – were shown to be an 
additional benefit to firms seeking credibility and looking to further differentiate 
themselves from their competitors who do not produce to these standards. It is reasonable 
to propose that firms with credible and longstanding reputations would have less need for 
certification to communicate credence attributes, though this was not evident in the limited 
sample of participants. Lastly, evidence in the interviews supported the simplifying effect 
of certification to mitigate transaction costs associated with consumer search costs and food 
distribution. Certification was thus a tool to reduce consumer and distributor transaction 
costs. 
3.5. Communication Tools 
 
The credence nature of quality attributes originating from on-farm production 
methods means that firms must communicate the presence of these attributes to reduce the 
information asymmetry between producers and consumers.  Whereas the discussion has 
previously focussed on the motivations for firms to adopt quality assurance mechanisms 
from the point of view of competitive advantage, this section will concentrate on the 
broader concept of communicating alternative farming methods to consumers.  
Information present at the point of purchase was clearly the most important conduit 
to communicate production attributes highlighted by respondents. The use of certification 
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marks, while key to mitigating information asymmetry in an economic framework, was 
mentioned by only three participants (Stahlbush Island Farms, Local Food Plus, and 
Shepherds Grain).  Packaging, labels, and point of sale materials were more common 
responses and were included in the two most important communication mechanisms by six 
of seven respondents. Point of sale materials were preferred by participants but can be used 
in limited situations; many retailers limit or do not allow point of sale material in their 
stores, and opportunities for food service placement are limited (Stahlbush Island Farms, 
Pine Valley Farms, Food Alliance, Shepherds Grain). When certification seals are present 
at the point of purchase, Local Food Plus highlighted their efforts to train retail personnel 
about the production methods relevant to the certification seals used on the products they 
sell. Certification marks arising from quality assurance mechanisms are one way to signal 
credence qualities, though the interviews made it evident that it is one of a suite of options 
that firms use. 
Presumably any packaging or labelling will include the brand of the company 
marketing it and a symbol of the certification if it is used. While some production methods 
may be described on the packaging, space limitations dictate that many cannot be 
described. Synthesizing all of the participants’ responses reveals that the primary moment 
of communication is at the point of purchase. Packaging and labels, complemented by 
brands and certification seals, are the most important communication tools for firms during 
the product/consumer interface. Underlying the ability of packaging and labels to 
communicate production derived quality is the use of brands and certification seals as 
quality cues that can signal reputation and past experiences. The notion that brands and 
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certification seals communicate production-derived attributes is perhaps implied when 
participants state the importance of packages and labels
10
.     
Advertising and public relations were also mentioned as important in 
communicating alternative production methods. Any promotion must be understood in the 
context that it may not communicate that a particular chicken breast has come from a 
naturally raised chicken, for example, but that a particular brand or certification represents 
a certain set of production methods or values. Thus certification or branding is required to 
cue the consumer to recall past promotion, but firms may not see these as communication 
tools in the same way that economists see them as signals to communicate quality. Similar 
to the importance of packaging and labelling, brands and certification seals seem implicit 
when firms discuss the importance of advertising and public relations. 
Building a firm’s brand or image was evident throughout the interviews and was 
coded ten times from five participants. MacRae said that Local Food Plus is “putting a lot 
more energy into brand recognition.” Both Food Alliance and Stahlbush Island Farms 
referred to the need for a certification agency – and other firms using the certification – to 
align with the values and reputation of a firm using a particular certification. Miedema of 
Stahlbush Island Farms referred to it as co-branding with the certification agency. 
Anderson of Food Alliance mentioned a similar co-branding effect between firms using the 
same certification. She said it was important for other firms using the certification to have 
good reputations and similar values. Clearly a firm would want to ensure that a certification 
mark added credibility to their products and thus the challenges of free-riding and adverse 
selection intrinsic to co-branding are important in this regard (Innes et al. 2007). 
                                                 
10
 Kosher or Halal foods are one example of symbols serving as heuristics for different production and 
processing methods. In many ways, the credibility issues examined throughout this thesis are analogous to 
those faced by Kosher and Halal foods.  
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Certification seals may be seen as co-brands that are used by many firms. As such they can 
represent not only the actual production methods but also the firm’s values.  
In the interviews it was evident that brand image can be important in determining 
the credibility of product claims. Raiche of United Natural Foods implied that firms that are 
perceived to have values congruent with their customers are better able to communicate 
production-derived claims. He said that communicating a company’s values would be more 
effective than establishing a certification if the firm was promoting unique production 
methods. For Raiche the main value to certification was when multiple firms used the same 
certification. This can be interpreted as a buttressing effect referred to earlier, where a 
particular standard or certification gains credibility in proportion with the amount of people 
using the certification in a process akin to how Keller (1993) sees the accumulation of 
brand equity.  Thus, while a certification seal or certifying organization can be seen as a 
brand itself, the interviews highlighted that a brand communicating a company’s values can 
also accurately signal the presence of production-derived attributes. 
 Use of the Internet as a direct communication link between consumers and other 
members of the agri-food supply chain including producers, food manufacturers and food 
processors was pervasive across the interviews and was mentioned by all participants. It 
was consistently referred to as the third or fourth mechanism for communication and was 
seen as a means to provide more information to the most interested consumers. Websites 
were referred to as places where consumers, who had likely already purchased the products, 
could go to find out more information about the goals, protocols, and values of the 
company producing the food. Raiche of United Natural Foods viewed using the Internet for 
a direct communication tool as representative of the broader trend of food manufacturers 
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increasingly communicating directly with consumers rather than through members of the 
supply chain that handle the goods. The increasing ability for consumers to easily obtain 
information from food manufacturers and contact them directly is an important trend as it 
makes it easier for them to be more open and accountable – an important factor in 
determining credibility in the mind of the consumer.      
3.6. Credibility 
 
“Consumer information systems generally in this country are a mess.” 
MacRae, Local Food Plus speaking about the Canadian market 
 
In the model outlined in the literature review, the perceived quality of a good is 
hypothesized to be a function of the belief consumers have in the presence of credence 
attributes. If consumers do not believe a claim of production-derived quality they will not 
buy the product and the demand for such a product will fall. It was further hypothesized 
that many competing claims in the absence of a consistent means of quality assurance 
would reduce the credibility of the claims. Participants’ comments suggest that both of 
these credibility impacts are present in the market for production-derived quality. 
One area exhibiting credibility erosion as a result of many similar claims was 
sustainability. The concept of sustainability usually encompasses three facets – 
 economic, social, and environmental. Raiche of United Natural Foods said, “sustainability 
claims are being made everywhere, though they have varying degrees of accuracy.” He 
questioned the usefulness of the term and had little faith in the current certifications. 
Anderson echoed the spirit of Raiche’s concerns referring to “greenwashing11” that is 
causing consumers to question brand claims. Weder of Prairie Heritage Beef similarly 
                                                 
11
 “Greenwashing” is a term referring to when many companies make claims about being environmentally 
friendly/sustainable without significantly changing their practices, disclosing what they mean by it, or having 
any sort of verification/proof. 
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observed the apparent lack of credibility with sustainability claims and suggested that 
certification had a role in mitigating them when he said, “there is a lot of scepticism out 
there about these things, and you need to have something to back it up.” Both Raiche and 
Weder alluded to the benefit of a quality assurance system to give sustainability claims 
credibility. An ideal system was referred by MacRae of Local Food Plus as one that firms 
can say “is rigorous, has standards, has inspections, and is the real deal.” Evidently, the 
reduced credibility of production-derived quality attributes caused by competing claims can 
be mitigated by quality assurance systems.  
As the central question of this thesis is defining the role for government in assuring 
production-derived food quality, participants were asked what they saw as the most 
credible type of organization to deliver a quality assurance system. There was a dichotomy 
among respondents as to whether a government organization would be seen as credible. 
Three respondents said government would be the most credible organization while four said 
that third-party organizations would be most credible and placed government second or 
lower. Miedema from Stahlbush Island Farms based in Oregon said that the type of 
consumer interested in organic and natural food is particularly mistrusting of the 
government. The initial hypothesis that Canadians see government as more credible than 
Americans was not evident in the limited sample of participants.  
Participants generally defined the credibility of quality assurance as being related to 
an organization’s ability to both create and enforce standards. Whilst only three participants 
saw government as the most credible, all acknowledged that government would be best to 
enforce a given standard. Raiche from United Natural Foods said it best; “when 
government comes up with policies, procedures and requirements, they are followed.” 
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Much of the mistrust in government mentioned by the three respondents was a result of 
perceived past incompetence in areas such as creating the USDA organic standard. 
Participants were disappointed that the final standard allowed highly industrial production 
methods and processed foods to be included in the standard. Participants also expressed 
disappointment in the composition of the final Canadian organic standard for similar 
reasons and suggested that government was incapable of creating an adequate result 
because it was subject to lobbying pressure. Weder of Prairie Heritage Beef said 
specifically, “government is often perceived as getting things approved because of lobby.” 
The lack of credibility for government was thus primarily reflective of activities in the 
political realm and was contrary to a general trust in the competence of government 
monitoring and enforcement.    
3.7. Components of Credibility 
 
 In addition to identifying which organizations would be most credible to deliver 
quality assurance, participants were also asked to explain why they ranked them in this 
way. Responses from this question were coded to identify the components of credibility 
occurring across respondents. Consistent with the work of Frewer et al. (1996) that looked 
at trust in various organizations for risk regulation and Frewer et al. (2005) that examined 
the credibility of different organizations in the context of animal welfare, the themes of 
interest, transparency, and competence emerged as important in determining the credibility 
of a particular organization. Credibility is assumed to be synonymous with someone 
placing trust in an organization to accurately communicate credence attributes. 
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3.7.1. Interest 
 
 The theme of interest was the most prevalent component of credibility expressed in 
the interviews. This theme referred to whether one party’s interests were akin to those of 
the other party in a transaction, and coded 11 times from five respondents throughout the 
interviews. There was however, a noticeable disconnect between what participants said and 
what their comments actually implied. Participants often referred to independence as being 
a good thing because the other party would not gain financially from opportunistic 
behaviour in a transaction. They also expressed the idea that an organization having similar 
general interests like goals and values would be more credible. Thus the word 
independence was very important for respondents but the underlying principal was that 
greater alignment of interests more generally contributed to credibility. Participants 
described credibility as varying with the degree of alignment between the interests of 
parties in a transaction. By implication, if both parties gained and lost simultaneously there 
would be a higher level of credibility because their interests move in the same direction. 
When one party does not gain or lose if the other gains – otherwise known as independence 
– this can be interpreted as contributing to less credibility than if they were fully aligned. 
The lowest level of credibility is when the interests of the parties involved in the transaction 
diverge, i.e. where one party gains and the other loses in a process akin to a zero sum game.  
Raiche from United Natural Foods stressed that formal certification is not always 
necessary for the credibility of production-derived claims. To him, the most important thing 
is for firms to communicate their values, and if these values were congruent with the other 
party’s values there would be trust. Raiche refers to one way that United Natural Foods 
expresses their interest in advancing the alternative farming methods sector as a whole by 
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“strongly supporting industry organizations that work for the benefit of the entire industry.” 
In this sense even though a firm could profit in the short-term by misrepresenting if a 
product is organic for example, by financially contributing to organizations that advance 
the whole industry they are signalling that their long-term interests are in-line with their 
transaction partners and they are less likely to cheat. Of course this type of action could be 
interpreted as an attempt to disguise their real motivations to profit from misrepresentation. 
The credence nature of these types of attributes means that no signal is ever perfect and it is 
likely that there will always be some degree of misrepresentation. 
Independence was the most common word associated with credibility throughout 
the interviews. Participants referred to independence as not gaining financially from 
misrepresenting a product and expressed that it was important for both creating standards 
and communicating the attributes of the products. For Anderson of Food Alliance, 
standards used for certification should be developed by a wide range of stakeholders to be 
credible and ensure that they do not serve the interests of just one party. This process of 
standard formation was seen as most likely to produce standards that were congruent with 
interests of consumers and not formed to serve the interests of producers for example. 
Certification organizations that monitor and communicate these standards were seen as 
most credible when they were described as independent. Raiche of United Natural Foods 
put it best by saying “it is advantageous for a dispassionate, unconnected, third-party” to 
certify production-derived quality. Weder of Prairie Heritage Beef echoed this sentiment 
and further defined what type of third party certifier was best with reference to the presence 
of financial interest. “Not for profit is better,” they have “no interest.” They are “someone 
who doesn't have an economic vested interest.” Both participants clearly emphasized that 
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independence was important to establish credibility. Underlying Weder’s comments 
however was the notion that a non-profit organization’s interests will be to promote the 
methods behind their certification – something the consumer presumably values because 
they are purchasing the product. Thus, the appearance of being at least financially 
independent from the transaction is important, but having aligned interests is better still.  
Participants routinely referred to a third party organization as independent; however 
these organizations clearly rely on the revenues from certification to cover costs and 
produce profits and thus have a vested interest in the certification process. It is important to 
note that a certification firm may have an incentive to certify as many products as possible 
to increase its revenues. The certification firm may also know that monitoring of its 
certification is incomplete and it could be less than diligent in its certification to maximize 
revenues. It is evident that independent third parties are not really independent when 
credence goods are involved and monitoring is imperfect, though this point was not raised 
by participants. Perceived values, motivations, and direct financial independence of the 
organization involved in assuring quality were the most important factors defining the 
interest component of credibility.  
3.7.2. Competence 
 
The second most prevalent theme related to credibility is competence; it coded six 
times throughout the interviews and was mentioned by three of the participants. 
Competence refers to knowledge, expertise, or ability shown in the area of production-
derived food quality. The notion that demonstrated ability will influence the perceived 
credibility of an organization is similar to the model presented by Grolleau and Caswell 
(2006) in the literature review. In their model they conclude that the presence of search and 
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experience attributes consistent with relevant claims from an organization will provide an 
accurate signal for credence attributes. This was the essence of how participants saw 
competence as contributing to the credibility of an organization. 
 One way that participants saw competence as portraying credibility was the amount 
of effort organizations put into production-derived quality. Raiche of United Natural Foods 
expressed his confidence in standards created by Whole Foods because he was “not aware 
of another retailer who puts as much effort, time, and research into developing or 
publishing standards as Whole Foods does.” Weder of Prairie Heritage Beef similarly 
supported his own organization’s credibility in communicating production-derived quality 
when asked if consumers enquire about the credibility of their product claims. “All the 
time, how do you prove what you say you are doing? I say here's the paperwork.” For both 
Weder and Raiche, the amount of energy expended in the process of communicating and 
recording production-derived claims lends credibility to the organization. 
 The reputation and past competence of organizations was another signal for 
credibility that was highlighted in the interviews. Congruent with the idea behind Grolleau 
and Caswell’s (2006) work, this concept highlights that a firm that has performed well in 
the past is likely to perform similarly well in the future. Raiche from United Natural Foods 
expressed his confidence in firms that have performed well to communicate production-
derived quality to their retail and food service customers. “We allow suppliers that we are 
comfortable with to explain their sustainability initiatives.” In other words, those who do 
not have a good reputation with the distributor are not permitted to communicate this type 
of production-derived quality. Presumably, the distributor sees the risk of these claims not 
being credible as too large given their lack of reputation. Participants’ responses evidently 
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showed that a firm’s credibility is a function of the competence they have displayed both in 
the past generally, and the competence they display specifically in reference to the attribute 
being communicated. 
3.7.3. Transparency 
 
Lastly, the theme of transparency was referred to four times by four of the 
participants. Being transparent meant giving consumers access to information pertaining to 
protocols and enforcement measures as well as being able to respond to questions and 
concerns arising from their claims. Participants emphasized that the Internet was an 
important component of this, as it coded seven times over the interviews and was 
mentioned by five participants. For Weder of Prairie Heritage Beef, being perceived as 
transparent was important. “We have an open and transparent system; we don't hide behind 
anybody.” In this he expressed that his organization could be trusted as any of its actions 
could be scrutinised to ensure that they were in-line with customers’ expectations. For 
example if consumers wanted to know what the animals were fed or the conditions of the 
pasture land they grazed on he could either provide them with the information or they could 
come to farm to see for themselves. Boldt of Pine Valley Farms made the same connection 
between transparency and confidence when she stated her “goal is to be transparent and 
authentic,” and with this we will “instil confidence.” Thus, the presence of transparency 
offers reassurance that a firm is not doing anything contrary to the interests of the other 
party and contributes to confidence in production derived claims. 
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3.8. Trust Equals Space - A General Theme 
 
A common thread throughout the interviews was that trust, and therefore the 
credibility of an organization, is proportional to the connectedness or space between two 
parties to a transaction. In one sense, this could be interpreted in a similar format to the 
concept of interest outlined above, where the space is defined as motivational in nature and 
the closer and more aligned those motivations are, the more trust exists. In another sense, 
this space can be relational in nature, where reputation and past competence contributes to 
trust, similar to the competence theme discussed above. Finally, this space can also be 
interpreted as physical or virtual space, where the closer and more accessible the two 
parties are to one another the more trust will exist in a similar fashion to the last theme of 
transparency. This last interpretation has important implications for the role of quality 
assurance systems in creating credibility for production-derived attributes. A pictorial 
representation of these relationships and their influence on the credibility of an organization 
communicating production-derived quality is show below in Figure 3.1.  
 
58 
 
 
Figure 3.1 What makes an organization a credible messenger? 
 
The characteristics of an organization outlined in the literature review as interest, 
competence and transparency are shown on the left of the above figure to determine the 
credibility of a messenger. On the right of Figure 3.1, the spatial elements of trust referred 
to as motivational, relational, and physical/virtual are shown to correspond to 
characteristics of a credible organization. The less distance there is between the motivations 
of parties to a transaction, the more their interests align and the more credible they will see 
the other party. Similarly, the closer that past relations have been congruent with 
expectations, the more competent they will consider the other party
12
. Lastly, the closer two 
                                                 
12
 Competence may be difficult to assess for consumers with little knowledge of production practices. 
“Congruent with expectations” in this sense represents that all of a producer actions will represent their 
competence in specific production areas. The usual caveat concerning the imperfect signalling of credence 
attributes still applies. 
Interest 
Credible Messenger 
Motivational 
 
Relational 
Elements of Trust 
Competence 
Physical/Virtual Transparency 
Characteristics of 
Organization 
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parties are in physical/transparent space, the more transparent they will be to each other. 
The figure outlines how trust and credibility can be viewed as spatially related. 
 With the proliferation of the Internet, virtual space is becoming more prevalent and 
important than ever before. While Boldt of Pine Valley Farms mentioned that 80% of her 
customers have likely visited her farm, she acknowledged that “if you’re not on the web, 
you’re not anywhere.” For people to feel a connection with a farm, for example, it becomes 
important for them to understand where it is, both in physical and virtual space. Physical 
space is defined as their location on the earth and virtual space as their presence on the web 
via a web page, advertisement or place in the expanding game “Second Life13.” The theme 
of credibility linked to space coded six times across the interviews by three participants 
who were all farmers (Pine Valley Farms, Stahlbush Island Farms, Shepherds Grain). The 
importance of place for Pine Valley Farms and Shepherds Grain may not be surprising 
considering that they sell primarily into their local markets. For Stahlbush Island Farms, 
who sells across the continental United States, it may be more surprising that their image 
and credibility that is tied to their brand was very much linked to the physical place where 
the farm exists.  
The Internet is changing how we define space. The interface between the virtual 
space of a company’s website and the physical space on a country road in Oregon for 
example is becoming blurred with the advent of Google Earth that enables relatively easy 
access to detailed satellite imagery. Where once the physical connection was a necessary 
part of creating credibility in the absence of a quality assurance system, the increasingly 
                                                 
13
 Second Life is a 3-D virtual world on the Internet where users can socialize and connect. Since opening to 
the public in 2003, it has grown explosively and today is inhabited by millions of users from around the globe.  
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ubiquitous virtual space seems to be redefining how this sense of connection is formed. The 
Internet both reinforces locality when consumers know the physical location of the farm 
and provides a substitute for it when consumers are farther away. Consumers may feel a 
connection with a farm they can see and explore virtually in the same way that they can feel 
a connection by actually visiting the farm. Whether the distance between two parties is 
motivational, relational, physical or virtual, it was evident throughout the interviews that 
the smaller the distance the more trust existed between two parties and the more credible 
they were perceived to be. 
3.9. Summary and Implications 
 
 Results from the current chapter represent a small sample of firms, thus some care 
is necessary when generalizing to other firms. The themes are general in nature however, 
and the interviews do provide a good indication of how the factors explored in the literature 
review exist in reality. Sprouting from the model in the literature review and buttressed by 
the analysis of the interviews conducted in the current chapter, search costs and credibility 
concerns are important drivers for quality assurance systems. Figure 3.2 illustrates the 
factors driving firms to adopt/discouraging firms from adopting forms of quality assurance. 
Firms striving to advance their competitive interests, mitigating credibility problems, 
and/or reducing search costs were all important in driving the use of quality assurance 
systems. Undertaking quality assurance was described as positioning firms to be more 
competitive from both an image and practical perspective; it enhanced their reputation and 
made their products more credible. The interviews revealed that certification systems based 
on universal standards used across firms can provide a credible minimal quality level. 
Reducing consumer search costs by signalling quality more succinctly was also shown to 
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be a driver of quality assurance. Firms are likely to use this credibility to promote 
production attributes in excess of those encompassed by a quality assurance system to 
differentiate their products in the marketplace.  
 
    
 
Figure 3.2 Factors influencing firms to adopt forms of quality assurance 
 
 Consumers’ desires for unique and chic products, coupled with firms’ needs to be 
differentiated for competitive reasons were shown to discourage the adoption of quality 
assurance involving universal standards necessary for certification across firms and 
products. The value of certification was understood to increase with the amount of like-
minded firms using it but this was also somewhat undesirable as it made a particular firm’s 
products less differentiated. The ability of firms to signal credence qualities without formal 
quality assurance also predictably discouraged the adoption of quality assurance. Firms 
who were large enough to create a strong reputation/brand, or small enough to develop 
personal relationships with their customers, saw less benefit in formal quality assurance 
systems for production attributes. The reputation and values of a firm communicated by a 
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brand may be an adequate and preferred quality signal in many cases where firms can 
communicate their values effectively, and prefer to remain differentiated from their 
competitors. These discouraging factors are important considerations when interpreting the 
potential benefit for government involvement in quality assurance systems. They signal that 
the benefits of credibility and reduced consumer search costs explored in the next chapter 
must be understood in the context of firms’ motivations. 
Based on the trust themes exhibited in the interviews, the role for quality assurance 
systems is increasingly prevalent the more motivational, relational, physical or virtual space 
exists between the parties of a transaction. For local producers able to establish 
relationships with their customers, a quality assurance system is likely unnecessary. The 
evolution of the Internet is making it easier for producers to form connections with 
consumers, though quality assurance systems are likely to play a role in communicating 
production-derived attributes to customers across a large geographic area.       
 Market impediments for production-derived attributes are becoming increasingly 
prevalent, as witnessed by the confusion surrounding sustainability claims. Transaction 
costs arising from credibility concerns and supply chain complexity inherent with multiple 
standards favour an evolution toward a system of quality assurance for production-derived 
attributes based on universal standards. Just as the organic industry eventually established 
universal standards in Canada
14
, it is likely that some form of universal standards will be 
forthcoming in response to prohibitive transaction costs for consumers and supply chain 
members.   
                                                 
14
 Establishing a national organic standard was also motivated by Canadian organic producers loosing access 
to the European Union market if one was not established. 
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 Finally, the challenges and incentives identified above have important implications 
for the role of various organizations in assuring production-derived quality. Most notably, 
setting standards must be done to balance the concerns associated with excessive 
transaction costs and maintaining adequate product differentiation. Given the necessity for 
government to widely consult and satisfy a plethora of stakeholders, setting standards that 
are amenable to consumers and producers may be a difficult task. When it comes to 
verifying whether a particular standard has been followed, government’s need and ability to 
represent the interests of everyone involved becomes an asset; it gives them credibility. 
Given participants’ responses, an investigation into how consumers perceive different 
organizations could give insights into an organization’s ability to administer a credible 
quality assurance system that reduces market confusion.  
3.10. Issues for Further Examination 
 
The preceding two chapters highlight the role that quality assurance can play in 
increasing the credibility of production derived claims and that all types of organizations 
may not be equally suited for this role. Further examination of how consumers determine 
which organizations can give credible quality assurance – and what impact this has on 
purchase decisions – is now warranted. The components of credibility arising out of this 
chapter must now be evaluated in a larger consumer context to determine the extent that 
each influences the credibility of an organization. The following two chapters explore these 
concepts in more detail using a consumer survey.  
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4.   CONSUMER SURVEY METHODOLOGY AND ESTIMATION METHODS 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
 
Emerging from the previous chapters is the need to examine both the nature of trust 
Canadians have in organizations to communicate production attributes and what effect this 
has on their willingness-to-pay (WTP) for these attributes. Theory predicts that verification 
organizations that are less trusted will result in lower WTP for the credence attributes they 
verify. Thus, if government is more trusted, its involvement can more easily signal 
production-derived quality via quality assurance. The trust literature and analysis presented 
in Chapter 3 imply that organizations that are perceived to be knowledgeable, transparent 
and accountable, and in-line with consumer interests will be most trusted. Information at 
the point-of-sale was the most important vehicle for firms to communicate production 
characteristics to consumers in the interviews. Certification seals/messages are only one 
component of this information and the significance of the verification agency has not been 
examined in Canada. This chapter outlines the methodology used to carry out and analyse a 
survey of Canadian consumers undertaken to explain how the type of organization 
verifying a quality signal affects the strength of preference for a quality attribute.  
The survey was designed to evaluate four key questions. First, how important is 
point-of-sale information relative to other factors in signalling production-derived quality? 
Second, how important are quality seals relative to other point of sale information?  Third, 
is willingness to pay affected by the verifying organization? Fourth, how does a consumer’s 
level and nature of trust in a verifying organization relate to his/her willingness to pay for 
this verification?  
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4.2. Conceptual Model 
 
The ability for a verifying organization to signal quality must be considered relative to 
quality signals. Classic examples of quality signals such as price, advertising, and brand 
equity are difficult to evaluate in a survey setting dealing with generic organization types. 
Therefore the survey was designed to incorporate factors mentioned in the interviews 
including information at the point-of-sale, store reputation, and an individual’s bias 
regarding food quality and trust in general. Figure 4.1 depicts the verifying organization 
and trust relative to these other factors in affecting the strength of a quality signal.   
 
 
Figure 4.1 Factors affecting quality signals for production-derived quality 
 
The survey evaluates the role of the verifying organization and the origin of the 
standard as quality cues or information signals. The impact of a quality seal is shown above 
to be influenced by the verifying organization and standard. Figure 4.1 suggests that trust in 
Strength of quality signal 
Context 
(e.g. store) 
Point of sale information 
(e.g. packaging, brand) 
Individual bias 
(e.g. trusting, view of system) 
Quality seal 
(certification, grading etc.) 
Verifying 
Organization Standard 
Trust 
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an organization to accurately communicate production methods and implement an effective 
standard is integral for a verifying organization or standard to signal quality. If an 
organization is not trusted, the model hypothesizes that neither its verification nor standard 
will serve as an effective quality signal. The survey explores several aspects of trust and the 
consequences for consumer utility and willingness-to-pay. 
 This chapter begins by outlining various empirical methods to estimate the utility 
consumers derive from a product’s characteristics. It continues with an outline of the 
methods used in the survey for data collection and choice experiment design. An empirical 
model is presented and econometric models used to estimate the model’s parameters are 
described.   
4.3. Preference Elicitation Methods 
 
The means used to estimate the utility that consumers derive from goods has 
evolved over time. A multitude of methods and models have attempted to capture the 
determinants of consumer utility since Lancaster (1966) first hypothesised that the 
aggregate utility of a good is a function of its characteristics. Both stated and revealed 
preference elicitation methods are used widely. Stated preferences are those obtained when 
participants state their preference in exercises like surveys, while revealed preferences are 
those where consumers reveal their preferences via a decision at the time of purchase 
(Train, 2003). Stated preference methods allow researchers to examine hypothetical 
products and attributes combinations, while revealed preference methods require the 
products to exist.  
From their roots in contingent valuation to conjoint and experimental auction 
methods, elicitation methods have evolved to more accurately assess consumer preferences. 
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The goal is to more accurately mimic the consumer purchase decision. Louviere (2006) 
cites Meyer et. al (1997) when describing an outcome such as a consumer purchase 
decision as being contingent on a number of factors as follows: 
),,,,,( TGCZXfY   where     (4.1) 
Y=a vector of behavioural outcomes; 
X=a matrix of factors describing options/outcomes (the choice set); 
Z=a matrix of individual/group factors; 
C=a matrix of context/environmental factors; 
G=a matrix of geographical/spatial factors; and 
T=a matrix of time-varying factors. 
 
The ability to accurately estimate a consumer’s purchase decision (Y), thus depends upon 
how well f is specified. It also implies that it is beneficial to include as many components of 
variance in the stochastic utility component as possible (Cardell, 1997). Further, the ability 
to generalize from an experimental context to a real-world context depends upon the degree 
to which the context/environmental vectors are constant across empirical and real-world 
domains. It is important to understand the above equation as it highlights the advantages 
and limitations of preference elicitation methods.  
Equation 4.1 means that the more closely an experiment mimics a real consumer 
purchase decision, the more accurately the resulting parameter estimates will reveal true 
components of utility. Beyond the usual social-demographic factors represented by Z, the 
transferability of experimental results will also hinge on the context (e.g. whether the 
experiment was carried out in the same environment as normal purchases are made) and the 
composition of the choice set itself (X). Discrete choice experiments (DCEs), where 
participants choose between alternatives comprised of different characteristics, are 
increasingly used to gauge consumer preferences.  
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Consumer purchase decisions are mimicked more closely in DCEs than in other 
methods like contingent valuation
15
 and conjoint rank or ratings exercises
16
.  They more 
closely represent the consumer’s actual purchase decision context by presenting a discrete 
choice among different products with varying characteristics; in a real purchase decision a 
consumer usually chooses only one product. Including an option to not choose one of the 
alternatives and defer purchase is a further effort to mimic real-world decisions, while 
being consistent with economic theory that allows substitution (Louviere et. al 2000). 
Though consistent with economic theory and similar to a consumer purchase decision, 
stated preference DCE’s where participants do not exchange real money for goods are still 
not as robust as revealed preference data.    
 All preference elicitation methods that do not involve participants exchanging real 
money when they make a choice are subject to hypothetical bias (see Alfnes and Rickertsen 
2002 for a review). Experimental auctions methods stemming from Shogren et al. (1994) 
and used more recently by e.g. Hobbs et al (2006) require that participants exchange real 
money for their choices and are thus less prone to upward bias of WTP estimates. Carlsson 
and Martinsson (2001) and Lusk et al (2008) are two examples of attempts to make DCEs 
incentive compatible by randomly selecting one choice set as a binding purchase
17
. 
Incentive compatible experimental auctions and DCEs are limited however to available 
products with existing product characteristics. Further, they are more labour intensive 
                                                 
15
 Contingent valuation exercises originated in the environmental economics literature. Valuations are 
generally comparative and typically involve either yes/no questions or questions such as “How much more 
would you be willing to pay for pesticide free wheat compared to regular bread?”  
 
16
 Conjoint ranking or ratings exercises involve participants rating or ranking products comprised of various 
attribute combinations. 
 
17
 Both studies were carried out in an experimental market setting where the money participants received for 
participating was reduced according to the cost of a randomly selected choice. 
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relative to other survey methods as they are most feasibly carried out in-person; 
consequently they tend to have smaller sample sizes with less geographic diversity. 
 The current research assesses the role for government in a Canadian context. Given 
the attributes of interested are of an experimental nature and not easily found in current 
products, the higher sampling costs of incentive compatible methods and the need for a 
diverse and geographically representative sample, DCE methods were deemed to be more 
practical. It is acknowledged that using a DCE comes with certain limitations, however its 
ability to model a consumer’s purchase decision, be consistent with economic theory, 
examine exploratory attributes, and to be applied to larger sample sizes make it the best 
choice for this thesis. 
4.4. Related Examples of Discrete Choice Experiments 
Increasingly, discrete choice experiments are being used in applied economics in 
numerous contexts, one of which is to determine the WTP for specific attributes. Examples 
of DCEs dealing specifically with eco-labelling
18
 of credence characteristics include Blend 
and Ravenswaay (1999), Nilsson et.al. (2005), Pardoe (2008), Wessels et. al. (1999) and 
Loureiro et al (2001). Both Pardoe and Wessels et. al. include the certification agency as an 
attribute.  
Both DCEs examining the effect of the certification agency were based on samples 
of American consumers. Wessels et. al. (1999) find no significant WTP effects for eco-
labelled seafood in their US sample of consumers for any of the organizations they used, 
including the World Wildlife Fund, Marine Stewardship Council, and the National Marine 
                                                 
18
 Eco-labelling identifies that a product has satisfied certain environmental conditions during its production. 
See “eco-label noun.” Environment in this sense refers to the conditions of production involving the 
interaction of the human and natural worlds. 
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Fisheries Service (a US government agency). They note that focus groups carried out prior 
to the experiment indicated that the US Department of Agriculture was seen as a respected 
certifying agency though it was not included in the experiment as wild fisheries are not 
under its mandate. Pardoe (2008) similarly indicated that there were no significant effects 
for certification agency in preliminary results looking at eggs and apples with specific 
production attributes in the US.  Pardoe included government, third party, and “not 
specified” as the options for the certification agency attribute. He was surprised by the 
result and indicated that it might have been a result of the way the choice experiment was 
presented to consumers; it was not well described and it was the last attribute listed. Both 
studies imply that in the United States there is not a large impact associated with the 
certification agency on the willingness to pay for the examined credence attributes, 
however their applicability to Canada is unclear. The following describes how the current 
study was designed to determine the impact of the verification agency in Canada. 
4.5. Survey Design 
 An on-line survey format following the Tailored Design Method outlined in 
Dillman (2000) was used to gather data for the current research. Internet use by individuals 
has been steadily rising in Canada; 73.2 percent of all residents over the age of 18 had 
access to the Internet in 2007 (Statistics Canada). Internet surveys are known to be prone to 
sampling biases against older, less wealthy and less educated individuals (Andrews et. al. 
2003). However, the continued growth of the Internet makes this less of a concern in the 
present investigation. In addition, the methodological advantages allowing efficient 
sampling of a geographically diverse group of participants also supports the use of an 
Internet-based survey for the current study.  
71 
 
The survey consisted of four main sections and can be found in Appendix C. First, 
characteristics about participants, their shopping habits, and how various factors affected 
their view of food quality were examined using five point Likert and discrete visual analog 
scales
19
. This section served to reveal individual characteristics and position process labels 
and verifying organization in the context of other quality cues. Second, a choice experiment 
asked participants to choose between three loaves of bread described by different attributes; 
participants could also choose not purchase any of the loaves of bread. The choice 
experiment is explained below. This section was designed to evaluate the utility derived 
from each attribute. Third, several questions assessed both the components of trust and trust 
in the organizations from the choice experiment. Lastly, socio-demographic questions were 
included to position the sample within the Canadian population. 
Early versions of the survey were pre-tested in person or over the telephone using 
focus groups totalling fifteen people in Saskatoon and Ontario. A refined paper version of 
the survey was then administered to 20 randomly selected shoppers at the Confederation 
Mall in Saskatoon. People from a range of socio-demographic groups were deliberately 
sought to ensure that questions were easily understood. Lastly, minor modifications were 
made before the survey was transposed on-line and pre-tested on 20 randomly selected 
volunteers at the University of Saskatchewan. In all, the survey was pre-tested on 55 people 
to ensure it was easily understood, functional, and capable of answering the research 
questions. The administration of the final survey is outlined in Chapter 5. 
                                                 
19
 Likert scales are those using a five or seven point scale with the categories: strongly disagree, disagree,... 
etc  whereas discrete visual analogue scale is the generic term for “likert type” scales that seek to measure the 
strength of a respondents opinion: e.g. unimportant, slightly important, moderately important, ...etc. 
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4.5.1. Choice Experiment Attribute Selection 
 
As mentioned, respondents were asked to choose between a series of product 
profiles describing the attributes of pre-packaged sliced bread as part of the DCE. Given the 
reputation of producers from the Canadian Prairie Provinces for producing high quality 
bread wheat and the continuing prevalence of wheat as a crop of major economic 
significance
20
, examining how the verification of alternative wheat farming methods 
impacts their credibility should be of interest to those involved in Western Canadian 
agriculture. Following the work of Hu et al (2005) who used bread as a product for a choice 
experiment, pre-packaged sliced bread was chosen as a product for the choice experiment 
as it is relevant to Western Canadian agriculture and consumed by most Canadians. In 
addition, bread is a staple food that respondents are likely to be familiar with and it allowed 
the exploration of several production-derived quality attributes.  
Each respondent was presented with eight choice sets, each comprised of four 
alternatives. Three of the alternatives were product profiles for pre-packaged loaf bread 
comprised of different attributes combinations, while the fourth was defined as “I would 
not purchase any of these products.” The attributes and levels used are described in Table 
4.1. 
                                                 
20
 For example, spring wheat – the most commonly used grain for bread flour – was harvested from 30% of 
Saskatchewan farmland in 2006 and produced a crop with a value of $1.21 billion (Saskatchewan Agriculture 
and Food, 2008). 
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Table 4.1 Attributes and levels included in the choice experiment 
Attribute Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 
Verifying 
Organization 
Government Third Party Supermarket Farmer Bakery 
Pesticide Free Yes No    
Environmentally 
Sustainable 
Yes No    
Price $1.99 $2.99 $3.99 $4.99  
 
The production-derived quality attributes pesticide free, and environmentally 
sustainable were selected to evaluate the importance of these attributes to Canadian 
consumers. Levels for the verifying organization attribute were selected to encompass a 
range of organization types that verify production-derived attributes. Verifying 
organizations included government, third party, bakery, farmer, and supermarket. Price was 
also included as an attribute to evaluate the tradeoffs participants make between attributes 
and facilitate willingness-to-pay calculations. 
 The choice of the pesticide free and environmentally sustainable attributes was 
based on an assessment of the current trends in the marketplace and past research studies. 
There is increasing attention being given these attributes in particular and their importance 
in the organic standard more generally. Pesticides are increasingly seen as undesirable, as 
witnessed by the recent bans on cosmetic pesticides for lawn care in Ontario and Quebec 
(Benzie, 2008; Block, 2006). Similarly, the environmental footprint of products, companies 
and individuals in general is increasingly prevalent in the public discourse, as witnessed by 
attention towards climate change and pollution in general.  
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Magnusson and Cranfield (2005) have previously examined the demand for 
pesticide free
21
 grain products in Canada. Whole wheat and multigrain bread ranked as the 
third and fourth products most likely to be bought in pesticide free form, slightly behind 
pasta and breakfast cereal. Their survey sampled Canadian consumers from Toronto, 
Winnipeg, and Vancouver in 2000 using a contingent valuation method to evaluate the 
characteristics of consumers most likely to be interested in pesticide free products. 
Research by the Canadian Federation of Agriculture (2007) that surveyed Canadian 
perceptions about domestic production suggested that growing practices were the number 
two concern of Canadians when purchasing grain products, behind freshness. When asked 
about specific concerns, in grain production, 72% of respondents were somewhat or very 
worried about pesticide use.  
  Research in Northern California by Onozaka et. al (2006) examined willingness-
to-pay for the components of organic produce that included pesticide free, genetically 
modified organism free, and environmentally sustainable. They found that consumers who 
did not buy organic produce regularly had significantly higher willingness-to-pay for the 
pesticide free attribute compared to the environmentally friendly attribute. In addition, 
information from the industry interviews conducted for this thesis reinforced the relevance 
of these attributes. For example, the certification agencies Food Alliance in Portland, 
Oregon and Local Food Plus in Toronto, Ontario both certify food as sustainable – a 
significant portion of this standard is comprised of environmental criteria. Shepherds Grain, 
an interview participant, also markets their bread wheat flour as being environmentally 
sustainable. 
                                                 
21
 Magnusson and Cranfield based their study on “Pesticide Free Production” that specified farming practises 
absent of pesticides while the crop was growing. 
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Quality assurance frequently involves multiple types of organizations to create 
standards, monitor production, certify suppliers, accredit certifiers and coordinate the 
system; however, these distinctions are unlikely to be understood by the average consumer. 
As such, the levels for the verification organization were selected to broadly represent the 
type of organization that consumers would most associate with a given production-derived 
claim. The types of verification organization were selected to represent a range of plausible 
options.  
Several levels of the verifying organization attribute are currently used or proposed 
in Canada including third party verification for animal welfare standards by the British 
Columbia Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and farmer verification by the 
Canadian Federation of Agriculture for their proposed green label program. Whole Foods 
Markets, a specialized natural and organic supermarket, although they use private certifiers, 
have established their own production standards and frequently include in-store messaging 
about the farming methods used to produce their products. In doing so they have become 
the messenger communicating how their products were produced and consumers are likely 
to rely on them to ensure that their products were produced according to the label. 
Consequently, the supermarket level was included to represent when a food retailer is the 
organization most associated with a production claim. Bakery verification is included as an 
attribute to represent when the production attribute is assured solely through the reputation 
of the brand of bread. Lastly, consistent with the focus of this thesis, government 
verification is included to probe the impact of government verification of these attributes. 
The United States Department of Agriculture Process Verified program outlined in Chapter 
2 is one example of government verification. As with the other levels for the verifying 
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organization, the organization attribute was designed to capture the type of organization 
most associated with a production claim.   
The price attribute levels were selected to represent a range of values corresponding 
to the retail price of a pre-packaged loaf of bread plus a premium of approximately 50 cents 
for the additional attributes included
22
 (i.e. at least one of environmentally sustainable or 
pesticide free). A survey of three stores in Saskatoon revealed that pre-packaged sliced 
bread ranged from $1.39 to $4.49. One dollar increments were used as levels to simplify the 
task of respondents. The large variation in bread prices resulting from factors that are not 
assessed in the current choice experiment means that the included prices primarily force 
participants to trade off attributes with monetary value. As such, the resulting WTP 
estimates should be interpreted as relative and not absolute, consistent with Louviere et al 
(2000) who emphasize that choice models are best interpreted as difference in attribute 
models. 
4.5.2. Choice Experiment Design 
 
 The choice experiment used a D-optimal design obtained using the Macro codes for 
SAS software designed by Kuhfeld (2005) (see also Kuhfeld and Tobias, 2005). 
Researchers that have utilized this technique for choice experiments involving food include 
Carlsson et. al. (2003), Liljenstolpe (2008), and Loureiro and Umberger (2007). D-optimal 
designs maximize the determinant of the variance-covariance matrix, otherwise known as 
the Fisher information matrix of the model to be estimated (Hensher et. al 2005). D-optimal 
designs contrast with better known orthogonal designs that make attributes statistically 
                                                 
22
 Actual premiums for the included attributes are unknown as few of the combinations are currently available 
in the marketplace. Therefore $0.50 represents an approximation for the monitoring and enforcement costs 
involved in verification as well as the additional production costs associated with these farming methods. 
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independent. Attributes in D-optimal designs are nearly balanced, nearly orthogonal and 
designed to yield the maximum amount of information from a choice experiment.  
 The design process started with a full factorial design for four attributes; one 
attribute had five levels, one had four, and two had two levels each, as described in the 
previous section. The full factorial design contained 80 different product profiles and was 
designed to estimate all main effects and the interactions between the verifying 
organization and the pesticide-free/environmentally sustainable attributes. To obtain choice 
profiles that were sensible, the macro was programmed to include choice profiles where at 
least one of the attributes pesticide free or environmentally sustainable was included; it 
would not make sense for there to be a verifying organization if there were no attributes to 
verify. Using a modified Fedorov algorithm, the %ChoicEff macro built the design into 32 
choice sets, each comprised of three choice profiles. These choice sets were then assigned 
to four blocks for four different versions of the survey, such that the attributes and block 
were uncorrelated
23
. This was done as it would be too onerous for one person to assess all 
32 choice sets. The final design is included in Appendix D.  
The DCE created by the above design allows the value that each respondent assigns to 
each level of the attributes to be elicited. Value can be expressed in monetary terms but is 
usually modelled in terms of utility by economists. The following section presents an 
empirical framework to interpret the results of the DCE. 
4.6. Modelling Framework for the Discrete Choice Experiment 
Choice behaviour is frequently modelled using a random utility maximization 
framework as outlined in Chapter 2. This is shown below in equation 4.1 where Uiq is the 
                                                 
23
 The SAS Macro MktBlock assigns the choice sets to blocks in an iterative fashion to ensure that each block 
maintains a balance of attribute levels (see Kuhfeld (2005) for more detail) 
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utility gained from the ith alternative by individual q. Utility is partitioned into two 
components, where V represents a systematic component varying with the attributes and ε 
represents a random unobserved component. 
iqiqiq VU        (4.1) 
 Individual q chooses alternative i that maximizes his or her utility from a choice set J= 
1,…,j. This can be represented as in Louviere et al (2000) as: 
jqiq UU    for all ij       (4.2) 
Substituting (4.1) into (4.2) gives: 
)()( jqjqiqiq VV       (4.3) 
And given that the individual will choose alternative i with probability Piq if: 
)()( jqiq UPUP  for all j≠i    (4.4) 
Yielding: 
)]()[( jqiqiqjqiq VVPP    for all j ≠i  (4.5) 
In other words, 4.5 is a random utility model where the probability of an individual 
choosing an alternative equals the probability that the difference between the random utility 
of alternative j and i is less than the difference between the systematic utility levels of 
alternatives j and i. We do not know the actual distribution of εqi – εqj across the population 
but assume that it is related to choice probability. 
In the context of the current investigation we can define a random utility model as, 
iqtiqtqziqiqtU       (4.6) 
and qqqqz z'        (4.7) 
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where Xiqt is a vector including credence quality attributes and the verifying organization, 
and zq is a vector of an individual’s socio-demographic and psychographic characteristics 
that includes trust in the verifying organization. The alternative specific intercept αiq 
captures an intrinsic preference for the alternative and δz’zq captures systematic preference 
heterogeneity as a function of an individual’s characteristics. Βqz is thus a parameter vector 
of an individual’s utility gained from the attributes of the choice experiment - some of this 
utility is associated with specified socio-demographic characteristics (zq).  This model will 
be used to elicit the impact of individual characteristics on a consumer’s WTP for specific 
attributes in the DCE. Parameter estimation was carried out using the econometric models 
described in the next section.
 
4.7. Discrete Choice Models  
 
Preferences for the attributes of the choice experiment are expected to be 
heterogeneous across the sample. A variety of models were used to accurately assess how – 
and by how much – preferences range across individuals in the sample. Using multiple 
methods allows a range of estimates to be compared, thereby allowing the reader to see the 
impact of assumptions made during model selection. All models in this thesis were 
estimated using NLOGIT 4.0.1 from Econometric Software (2007). 
4.7.1. Multinomial Logit Model 
 
The multinomial logit (MNL) model is widely regarded as the base estimation 
model for discrete choice experiments (Train 2003, Hensher et. al 2005, Louviere et al 
2000). It is a closed form model that can be estimated without the use of computer 
simulation methods, though its assumptions can be restrictive in practice. The MNL model 
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assumes the error term is independently and identically distributed Gumbel (Train 2003). 
This means that the error term does not vary systematically across alternatives and is 
identically distributed across participants – i.e. consumers are homogeneous as all 
heterogeneity is captured by the specified variables (βq= β). The cumulative distribution 
and the assumption of independent error terms imply we can write the MNL choice 
probability as: 




j
qi
qjqzqj
qiqzqi
e
e
P


    (4.7) 
where all variables are as before and Pqi is the probability of choosing alternative i for 
individual q. 
The conditional multinomial logit probability takes a closed form between 0 and 1. 
The unconditional probability is derived by summing over all participants and choices. A 
dummy variable yqj takes a value of 1 for the chosen alternative and 0 for the non-chosen 
alternatives. This gives the log-likelihood as: 

 

Q
q
J
j
qjqjqzqj PyLL
1 1
ln),(     (4.8) 
The coefficients βqz , and αqj are estimable from the first order condition of the log-
likelihood function. As discussed, the logit choice probability is derived by assuming 
independence and a distribution of the error terms in the utility function. This results in two 
consequences: the MNL model overestimates the joint probability of close substitutes 
because of the independence of irrelevant alternatives property (see Luce 1959), and it does 
not allow for random taste variation as the unknown utility terms are assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed. In practice this means that these models often do 
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not produce the best results though they provide a robust comparative benchmark for other 
models capable of handling heterogeneity. 
Individual heterogeneity is difficult to capture in MNL models as an individual’s 
characteristics are invariant across alternatives. This means that the effects of an 
individual’s characteristics are not identifiable in the probability of choosing a particular 
product over the alternatives in the choice set. Some researchers, including Adamowicz et. 
al. (1997),  have attempted to capture individual heterogeneity by interacting individual 
specific variables with attributes that vary across the alternatives in a given choice set. In 
labelled or branded choice experiments where an alternative is always identified as a given 
type of product
24
 this may also be accomplished by interacting individual characteristics 
with an alternative specific constant for each labelled alternative. These methods are 
limited, however, as they require a priori selection of individual characteristics and involve 
a limited inclusion of individual specific variables. Additionally, interpreting the 
coefficients of the interacted variables in the current context is only mildly informative. 
Although the MNL model is convenient, the restrictions imposed by the model are 
often untenable both theoretically and practically. Consumers are widely regarded to have 
heterogeneous preferences that are rarely fully captured by the included parameters. Two 
types of modelling approaches are used to account for individual preference heterogeneity: 
the random parameter and latent class multinomial logit models. 
4.7.2. Random Parameters Logit 
 
Empirical discrete choice research increasingly uses random parameter logit models 
for utility estimation. The Random Parameters Logit (RPL) model, sometimes called mixed 
                                                 
24
 e.g. alternatives in all choice sets may be labelled (organic, conventional and environmentally friendly) as 
compared to unlabelled (A,B, and C) 
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logit, is used because it is more realistic than the MNL; it relaxes both the i.i.d. and IIA 
restrictions and assumes heterogeneity among individuals in a sample (for a derivation of 
the model see Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1984; Revelt and Train 1999). Thus βqz is allowed to 
be different from β, thereby accounting for unobserved taste variation. One cannot observe 
enough replications to observe βqz however and instead distributional assumptions are made 
about each coefficient to obtain an expected value across the sample
25
. Distributional 
assumptions of the parameters can have significant impacts on the estimates and standard 
errors. Thus while the RPL model is sufficiently flexible to account for a range of 
heterogeneity, the specificity of distributional assumptions for individual preferences make 
if difficult to accurately determine the correct specification of a parameter’s heterogeneity. 
Using the RPL model, parameters in the choice experiment are assumed to be 
individual specific. Taste is assumed to vary randomly across the population according to a 
continuous distributional function, f(B.) The choice probability Pqi is defined as the integral 
of conditional choice probability Lqi(Bq) over all possible values of B along the 
f(B)distribution(see Greene, 2007): 
  


Cj qzqj
qzqi
qzqiqzqi LwheredfL
)'exp(
)exp(
)()()(Pqi




 (4.9) 
 
In order to retrieve individual-level parameters, Bayes theorem is used and the following 
integral is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood using 100 Halton draws. 
                                                 
25
 Distributions commonly specified include normal, lognormal and triangular; see Greene (2007) for more 
detail. 
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 To account for the source of individual heterogeneity, the means of the parameter 
distributions (βkq ) are allowed to vary with observed individual characteristics (zq) 
according to the following: 
kqkqkkkq vz   '      (4.11) 
Where βk is the population mean, vkq is the individual specific heterogeneity, with mean 
zero and standard deviation one, and ζk is the standard deviation of the distribution of βkqs 
around βk. The parameter δk represents the amount that an individual’s characteristics affect 
the mean of a random parameter. Thus, with the RPL model preference heterogeneity is 
assumed and accommodated by the model. The effects of observed sources of preference 
heterogeneity are estimated by the model thereby illuminating some factors influencing an 
individual’s parameters. For more detail see Hensher et.al. (2005) or Greene and Hensher 
(2003).  
Despite the ability for a RPL model to partly capture the source of preference 
heterogeneity, it is difficult to include enough parameters to accurately specify all reasons 
for individual parameters to vary. As a consequence, estimates contain unexplained 
heterogeneity that when reported as a mean for the population may mask important 
variations in preference across the population. Estimates for the RPL model are presented 
in Chapter 5. The latent class multinomial logit model is a model that incorporates 
unobserved preference heterogeneity into the estimation procedure. 
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4.7.3. Latent Class Multinomial Logit Model 
Unlike the RPL model where random parameters follow a continuous joint 
distribution (f(B) in equation 4.9) the latent class multinomial logit model (LCML) is 
approximated by a discrete distribution (see Boxall and Adamowicz 2002, and Greene and 
Hensher 2003). In this way classes with different tastes are endogenously estimated from 
the data. In effect, the population is divided into F different classes (F=1,…f) and β is class 
specific (βf). Using a random utility function as in equation 4.6 for an individual q, 
belonging to class f choosing alternative i is defined as: 
qifqifqifqifU   '     (4.12) 
 Latent class models are assumed to be heterogeneous between classes and 
homogeneous within classes. Thus the LCML model for a given class is similar to the 
MNL model presented in equation (4.8): 
 

J
j jqF
iqF
FiqP
1
|
)'exp(
)'exp(


    F= 1,…f    (4.13) 
 The parameters are estimated using maximum likelihood estimation where the 
number of classes, F, is given. Therefore, F, must be selected prior to estimation. Boxall 
and Adamowicz (2002), Greene and Hensher (2003), and Hu (2004) discuss the estimation 
criterion to select the number of classes. Results for the LCML model are presented in 
Chapter 5. 
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4.8. Estimating Willingness to Pay 
 
 An individual’s willingness-to-pay for an attribute is most often defined as the net 
income change equalling a change in quality or quantity of the attribute. Interpreting 
marginal willingness-to-pay from the utility function is thus straightforward. It is the 
marginal change in the price parameter required to keep utility constant following a 
marginal change in the quality parameter. This can be represented using the parameters 
from (4.8) as: 
WTP = 
p
z



       (4.14) 
Where βz is the parameter estimate for the variable of interest and βp is the parameter for 
price. In a MNL model where βz and βp are point estimates, WTP can be calculated 
directly, as specified in equation (4.14). 
 In a RPL model with the estimates resulting from draws from a specified 
distribution, the resulting WTP ratios constructed with a random parameter can be 
calculated in several ways. As described in Hensher et. al. (2005), WTP estimates can be 
calculated from the unconditional mean estimates for the population, or from the 
conditional individual parameter estimates that are conditional upon all information on each 
individual. Conditional WTP estimates for the population are then calculated as the average 
of individual conditional estimates.  
Both conditional and unconditional estimates are given for the RPL model. Using 
conditional parameter estimates to construct WTP ratios results in a more realistic range of 
values representing a posterior distribution based on the revealed preferences of 
respondents. The unconditional estimates are presented primarily to illustrate confidence 
intervals for variable specific WTP. As the conditional estimates for the sample represent 
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an average constructed from the mean of each individual participant’s conditional 
distribution, presenting a confidence interval based on the sample distribution is not 
appropriate. Thus the unconditional estimates from the RPL and LC models provide insight 
into the confidence of the estimates based on the standard error of the estimates. In this 
study, standard errors are calculated using the Delta method for non-linear models outlined 
in Greene (2002, pg 674) and Nilsson (2005). These estimates are presented in Chapter 5. 
4.9. Econometric Models to Evaluate Trust 
 
An ordered choice model is used to evaluate how the components of trust explored 
in the survey influence an individual’s level of trust in a particular organization. 
Respondents assigned each organization a rating on a five point scale to specify their level 
of trust in question 16 of the survey. Thus the data is of an ordered nature (1,2,3,4,5) and 
can be modelled according to the following choice specification from Greene (2007): 
1]|[,0]|[),|(~,'*  iiiiiiii VarEFy     (4.14) 
where        yi* = unobserved latent preference variable measuring the amount of trust 
individual i  has in a particular organization for accurate information about 
farming methods 
χi=  a vector of explanatory variables describing an individual’s propensity to 
trust, their perception of an organization’s level of knowledge (question 17) 
and transparency (question 18), and degree that they perceive the 
organization to represent their best interests (quesiton19) 
β =a vector of parameters to be estimated and 
εi=a random error term (assumed to follow a standard normal distribution) 
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The discrete level of trust observed variable yi  is determined from the model as 
follows:  
yi =1 if yi ≤ µ0, (not at all) 
 =2 if µ0  ≤ yi ≤µ1 (very little)   
=3 if µ1 ≤ yi ≤µ2 (somewhat)          
 =4 if µ2 ≤ yi ≤µ3 (very much) 
 =5 if µ3 ≤ yi ≤µ4 (completely) 
 (4.15) 
Where µ represents thresholds to be estimated along with the parameter vector β.. Estimates 
are obtained by maximum likelihood and the probabilities which enter the log likelihood 
function are: 
Prob[yi=j] = Prob [yi*is in the jth range]    (4.16)  
An ordered probit model was selected as the data is expected to be normally distributed. 
Further details on the model can be found in Greene (2002). Results of this analysis are 
presented in chapter 5. 
4.10. Summary 
 
This chapter outlined the methods used to carry out and analyse the Internet based 
consumer survey comprising the main empirical portion of the thesis. It was designed to 
elucidate how the organization verifying a production derived quality attribute affects 
consumer purchase decisions. Concurrently, it sought to assess how respondents’ trust, and 
the nature of this trust, varied across different types of verifying organizations. Discrete 
choice models are used to evaluate the utility that respondents derived from various 
attributes in the choice experiment. Ordered probit estimation is used to evaluate the nature 
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of trust that respondents put in an organization. Results from these analyses are presented in 
the following chapter.   
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5. RESULTS OF THE CANADIAN CONSUMER SURVEY 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter reports the results of the Canadian consumer survey administered on 
the Internet by Test Scoring and Questionnaire Services at the University of Alberta in June 
2008.  Five hundred and thirty six participants were recruited via e-mail by Leger 
Marketing in Edmonton from their on-line panel of Canadian consumers. Participants were 
asked to participate in the “food survey” only if they purchased pre-packaged sliced bread; 
this was done to sample only those consumers who are likely to know at what price they 
would substitute their normal bread for the hypothetical bread in the choice experiment. 
Respondents were assigned a unique identification code by the market research company to 
ensure anonymity and that each respondent completed the survey only once. After selecting 
participants’ data that appeared to represent valid responses, 120 respondents from each of 
the four blocks were retained for the final dataset resulting in a total sample size of 480
26
. 
Unless otherwise noted, all results presented in this section use this sample. 
 Results are organized as follows. First, the socio-demographic characteristics of the 
sample are described. Second, descriptive statistics on individual questions are presented to 
provide a snapshot of how respondents perceive farming methods in general. Third, the 
relative strengths of various quality cues are presented. Fourth, the level and determinants 
of trust for verification organizations are presented to show how consumers perceive 
                                                 
26
 Respondents were removed primarily to ensure good quality data (i.e. they were removed if they did not 
buy bread from grains produced on the prairies -i.e. rice bread- or had an unreasonable number of don’t 
know/not sure responses). Following an initial sorting and selection, other participants were removed to 
ensure that the survey blocks retained equal numbers. These participants did not report their income, or their 
postal code. Not all respondents who did not report their income were removed as initial regressions found 
income to be an insignificant variable. 
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different types of organizations. Lastly, results from the discrete choice experiment are 
described to show the value that consumers assign to various attributes. 
5.2. Results Interpretation  
 
This thesis focuses on food quality from farming methods, though it is important to 
place this investigation relative to the plethora of other types of food quality that interest 
consumers. To understand the importance of the information revealed in the following 
section, it is best considered in light of past studies looking at food quality more generally. 
Two recent studies by Ipsos-Reid (2006) and the Canadian Federation of Agriculture 
(2007) shed light on the relative importance of farming methods as a component of food 
quality for Canadians.   
Ipsos-Reid (2006) reports that consumers consider factors influencing their food 
purchases in various tiers; nutritional value, safety, and taste ranked as the top three 
components respectively, followed by factors such as environmentally responsible 
production and country of origin. Price followed all of these factors. The CFA reports 
consumers’ top of mind concerns with grain and grain products specifically; they found that 
price, freshness, and healthfulness were sequentially the most important factors driving 
purchases of grain products. These approximations represent averages across the general 
population and do not account for segments of consumers with strong preferences. The 
Ipsos Reid survey, for example, finds that 16% of Canadians are concerned natural food 
buyers seeking premium quality foods coming from natural/organic production methods –
and they are willing to pay premium for these methods. Thus, the results presented in this 
thesis aim to elucidate not only the effects across the sample, but the magnitude of these 
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effects among those most interested in food quality arising from alternative farming 
methods.  
5.3. Sample Characteristics 
 
Participants in the survey sample are reasonably well distributed geographically 
across the country with the exception of very few respondents from Quebec, as shown in 
Figure 5.1. This is expected as the survey was only available in English and the majority of 
Quebecois speak French. Logistical and practical challenges prevented the survey from 
being administered in French. Thus the results of the survey should be interpreted to be 
representative of English speaking Canadians only. The sample is also representative of the 
number of Canadians living in a rural/urban setting, with 81% coming from a forward 
sortation area
27
 contained by a census metropolitan area or census agglomeration
28
; 80% of 
Canadians live in urban areas (Statistics Canada, 2008
a
). This is depicted visually in Figure 
5.1 with white dots representing respondents from a rural forward sortation area and blue 
dots representing those from an urban forward sortation area.  
                                                 
27
 An area defined by the first three letters of a respondent’s postal code (n=468) 
28
 A census metropolitan area and a census agglomeration are defined by Statistics Canada as consisting of 
one or more adjacent municipalities situated around a major urban core. To form a census metropolitan area, 
the urban core must have a population of at least 100,000. To form a census agglomeration, the urban core 
must have a population of at least 10,000. 
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Figure 5.1 Visual representation of the distribution of survey respondents 
 
 In addition to being well distributed across the country, respondents are also 
distributed similarly to the Canadian population. Figure 5.2 shows the percentage 
breakdown of the sample by province relative to the Canadian population. The figure shows 
that Quebec is predictably underrepresented while the other provinces are consequently 
overrepresented. Upon inspection it appears however that the sample maintains a 
reasonable distribution between provinces in proportion to their share of the national 
population. There were no respondents from Yukon, Northwest or Nunavut Territories; 
however this is not a serious concern as their combined population represents only 0.32 % 
of the Canadian population (Statistics Canada, 2008
b
). 
(CRERL, 2008) 
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Figure 5.2 Origin of respondents by province compared to the Canadian population 
 
 Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents were collected and are presented 
in Table 5.1. The sample is representative of the Canadian population in age, household 
size, number of children in household and sex. As expected, the sample is slightly more 
educated than the Canadian population; Internet surveys are prone to attract more educated 
respondents (Andrews et. al. 2003).   
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Table 5.31 Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents 
Characteristic Sample Mean Canadian 
Population 
Age 47.2 45.7
1
 
Household Size 2.61 2.49 
Number of Children in 
Household 
0.56 0.55 
Female (percent) 56.2 51.1
1
 
Education- (% in each class)
 2
   
Less than High School 3.6 20.0 
High School Graduate 39.2 36.7 
University/College Graduate 45.4 36.0 
Graduate School 11.8 7.1 
1
For Canadians between 19-80, the age range represented in the sample 
2
 For Canadians 20+  
(adapted from Statistics Canada, 2008
b
 ) 
 
Lastly, the annual household income of respondents was similar to the Canadian 
population, as shown in Figure 5.3. As expected, the sample is slightly biased against those 
with lower incomes as shown most prominantly by the categories on the left representing 
those making less than $39 999 per year. Using a z test for proportions (Sirkin, 2006), the 
sample contains a significantly larger percentage of respondents with an annual household 
income less than $39 999 and between $70 000 and $79 000 than the Canadian population. 
However, the remainder of the sample is reasonably representative of the Canadian 
population with respect to income as shown by the similar height of the remaining bars.  
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Figure 5.3 Annual household income of respondents compared to the Canadian 
population 
(adapted from Statistics Canada, 2008
b
) 
 
 Overall, the evidence presented above suggests that the sample has similar socio-
demographic characteristics to English-speaking Canadians. It is notably slightly more 
educated and has a slightly higher income level. A random sample of 480 respondents 
accurately represents the responses of English-speaking Canadians given the same survey 
within 4.5% of the population mean, 95% of the time according to Louviere et.al. (2000)
29
. 
While some bias may exist because respondents are members of a consumer panel, there is 
no a priori expectation for the direction of this bias in the current study. Thus the 
oversampling of high income and highly educated participants notwithstanding, the current 
sample is a reasonable approximation of a random sample of Canadians. 
5.4. Providing Context to Evaluate Production-Derived Quality Verification 
 
Initial survey questions assessed participants’ priorities when purchasing food and 
their perceptions and knowledge about farming practices. The following descriptive 
                                                 
29
 Given a true population mean of 0.5, representative of no a priori expectations 
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statistics serve to determine the percentage of consumers likely to be interested in 
alternative farming methods. They provide a point of departure to evaluate the effect of 
different verifying organizations for alternative farming methods. All questions were 
presented as statements to which respondents could state their level of agreement on a five 
point Likert scale.  
5.4.1. Perceptions about Farming Methods 
 
Consumers caring about the farming methods used to produce their food can be 
considered as a necessary condition for them to purchase foods containing attributes 
coming from alternative farming methods. Figure 5.4 reports the responses to a statement 
regarding respondents’ interest in farming methods. Respondents disagreeing with the 
statement represent 69% of the sample. Further, 29% of respondents strongly disagreed 
with this statement suggesting that they are keenly interested in how their food is produced. 
This means that at most, 70% of the sample would be interested in purchasing food from 
alternative farming methods, and of these 30% are most likely to be interested. From these 
results it is evident that a significant number of people are interested in the farming 
methods used to produce their foods, though the reasons why they see them as important 
are not revealed. 
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Figure 5.4 Responses to  question 4a,“I don’t care about the farming methods used to 
produce my food” 
 
 Possible explanations for why people see farming methods as important include 
their impact on the environment and human health. Both are increasingly prevalent in 
public discourse and were included as attributes in the choice experiment. To gauge how 
respondents viewed the environmental impact of current farming methods, they were asked 
to agree or disagree with the statement “current farming methods are harmful to the 
environment.” As shown below in Figure 5.5, 35% of respondents either agreed or strongly 
agreed with this statement. While a considerable number of people were either neutral or 
not sure (35%), the amount of people agreeing with the statement shows that, when 
prompted,  some people clearly see current agricultural methods as unsustainable 
environmentally. Participants agreeing outnumbered those disagreeing with the 
statemement by more than two to one, reinforcing the relevance of the environmentally 
sustainable attribute in the choice experiment.  
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Figure 5.5 Responses to question 4c, “Current farming methods are harmful to the 
environment” 
 
 The other production-derived attribute in the choice experiment was that the grains 
in the bread were produced without the use of chemical pesticides. To gauge the 
importance of this attribute vis-à-vis human health in food purchases, respondents were 
asked to state the degree to which they agreed with the statement, “I consider the human 
health effects caused by pesticide use when I purchase food.” Figure 5.6 illustrates below 
that 50% of respondents claim they think about the human health effects of pesticide use 
when purchasing food – more than twice the number of those who disagree/strongly 
disagree with the statement, though it is not clear if these concerns are based on knowledge 
of current farming methods. 
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Figure 5.6 Responses to question 5a, “I consider the human health effects caused by 
pesticide use when I purchase food” 
 
Canadian consumers are widely regarded to have limited knowledge about 
agricultural production (Ipsos Reid, 2006; CFA, 2007). Pesticide application is regulated by 
the provinces in Canada. As such it was difficult to gauge respondents’ knowledge of 
current farming methods by asking questions relating to pesticide application requirements 
across a national sample. Instead, respondents were asked to state the strength of their 
agreement with the statement: “farmers are permitted to apply pesticide to grains as many 
times as they need to.” Those agreeing with this statement correctly identified that there are 
no restrictions on the number of times that farmers can apply pesticides according to the 
guidelines printed on the label of each chemical. As expected, only 18% of respondents 
correctly answered the question, with the majority (50%) unsure or neutral as shown below 
in Figure 5.7. This implies that although half of participants considered the health effects of 
pesticide use, only one fifth of them were knowledgeable about current pesticide regulation. 
It is unclear whether respondents who consider the health effects of pesticide use while 
making purchase decisions do so because they are unaware of how pesticide use is 
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regulated or believe that farmers apply them liberally at their leisure. In any case,  it 
appears that few people correctly understand pesticide regulation in Canada.    
 
 
Figure 5.7 Responses to question 4e, “Farmers are permitted to apply pesticide to 
grains as many times as they need to.” 
 
5.4.2. Relevance of Process Labels 
 
The preceeding results underscore that a segment of the population is interested in 
credence quality characteristics coming from farming methods. Information on food labels 
is frequently used to alleviate information asymmetry inherent with credence attributes. To 
determine the usefulness of these labels, it is necessary to know whether consumers 
actually notice them. People can be interested in these attributes but if they do not notice 
the primary tool to communicate these attributes, consumers will be less likely to purchase 
products containing these attributes. Thus, respondents were asked to rate their strength of 
agreement with the statement:”I pay attention to labels describing how food was produced 
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Neutral
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and traded when I purchase food.” The results to this question are show below in Figure 
5.8.  
 
 
Figure 5.8 Responses to question 5c, “I pay attention to labels describing how food 
was produced and traded when I purchase food.” 
 
Figure 5.8 shows that 44% of respondents agree/strongly agree that they notice food 
labels describing how their food was produced or traded. The sub-sample of respondents 
who care about how their food is produced revealed a similar percentage (38.5%). It is 
unclear how accurately these results represent respondent behaviour in real market 
scenarios – i.e. do these people really notice these labels. Given the relative infancy of 
process labels on the market, respondents were also asked to state their strength of 
agreement with the statement: ”I regularly read nutritional labels on the food I purchase.” 
Supporting the results presented in Figure 5.8, 75% of respondents either agreed/strongly 
agreed with this statement. This suggests that labels identifying process characterstics from 
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alternative farming methods may be a reasonably effective way to alleviate information 
asymmetry if people believe the information they read. 
5.4.3. Do People Trust Labels? 
 
As highlighted in the theoretical framework in Chapter 2 and again in Chapter 4, 
labels will only be effective at alleviateing information asymmetry if they are trusted by 
consumers. To assses the level of trust that consumers have in food labels, respondents 
were asked to state the extent they agreed with the following statement:”I always believe 
information on food labels.” The responses to this question are shown below in Figure 5.9. 
 
Figure 5.9 Responses to question 4d, “I always believe information on food labels” 
 
 Figure 5.9 shows that a significant number of people do not trust that the 
information on food labels is always accurate: the number of respondents who 
disagree/strongly disagree (42%) is higher than those who agree/strongly agree (31%). To 
examine if those interested in production-derived characteristics differ in their likelihood to 
trust food labels, responses to this question were also examined for the subsample of 
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respondents who notice labels describing how their food was produced or traded. Similar 
results were found, with 40%  of the subsample disagreeing/strongly disagreeing with the 
statement compared to 25% who were in agreement/strongly in agreement. Given that 
current federal regulations prohibit false or misleading information
30
, it is clear that for 
credence attributes to be successfully communicated, a more stringent and better 
communicated system of quality verification is needed than current labelling enforcement. 
A Canadian example of this type of quality monitoring and verification is organic products 
whereby they are certified and labelled according to a specific standard.  A harmonized 
National Standard for Organic Production Systems was introduced in 2006 but will not be 
mandatory until fully implemented in December 2008. As such, at the time of the survey 
organic food products were frequently labelled and certified to a standard, though the 
standard was not uniform across certifiers.  
5.4.4. Evidence from Organic 
 
To gauge the ability of a quality assurance system to increase consumer confidence 
in labels, respondents were asked if they avoid purchasing organic products because they 
didn’t believe they were organic. Responses to this question are presented below in Figure 
5.10. 
                                                 
30
 The federal Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act 7(1) states that no one may sell, import, or advertise 
“any pre-packaged product that has applied to it a label that contains any false or misleading representation 
relating to or that may reasonably be regarded as relating to that product” 
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Figure 5.10 Responses to question 5f, “I avoid purchasing organic products because I 
question if they are organic.” 
 
As shown above, 26% of respondents indicated they have avoided organic products 
because they didn’t believe they were organic. Evidently there is a considerable amount of 
distrust in labels even if they are likely to be accompanied by a quality assurance system. It 
is unclear what percentage of potential purchases has been affected by consumers not 
believing that products were indeed organic; those respondents who disagree may not ever 
purchase organic. These results indicate that even when a quality assurance system is 
endorsed by government and operated by third party organizations, a significant amount of 
distrust in the presence of credence attributes will continue to exist. The extent that trust in 
organic labelling can be improved with consistent standards,  recognized logos and 
mandatory certification will be clear following the implementation of the new National 
Standard for Organic Production Systems in late 2008. As outlined in Chapter 2, a 
consistent label and standard should serve as a more accurate quality signal; more visible 
government endorsement of this farming method via the national standard is likely to 
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change the normative views of society towards organic farming more generally. Further if 
consumers know that all products labelled as organic must be certified, they are more likely 
to believe organic labels.  
The descriptive statistics outlined above provide a preliminary indication that a 
sizable portion of respondents are interested in the farming methods used to produce their 
food and that pesticide use is of concern to consumers. A significant portion of respondents 
also viewed current farming methods as harmful to the environment. The results indicate 
that labels may be an effective means to communicate production-derived quality, though 
achieving a high level of trust may be difficult. Evidence from the current organic market 
suggests that this persists even when the labels are accompanied by a quality assurance 
program that is not mandatory, easily recognized or conforming to a common standard. The 
following section looks at the importance of labels to signal product quality relative to other 
potential signals. 
5.5. Signaling Product Quality 
 
Following Figure 4.1 that outlined various factors affecting the strength of a quality 
signal for production-derived attributes, labels are just one way that firms may signal 
credence characteristics. Chapter 2 examined research demonstrating that brand, reputation 
and certification can be effective quality cues for credence attributes. Interviews in Chapter 
3 highlighted the importance of information available at the point of purchase in 
communicating production-derived quality. Results presented below in Figure 5.11 attempt 
to capture the relative importance of these various quality signals. The figure shows how 
important each quality signal was to respondents’ confidence in the quality of a food 
product.    
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Figure 5.11 Mean importance ratings of food quality signals with 95 percent 
confidence intervals
31
 
 
 Figure 5.11 shows that the information on the label is the most important of these 
factors in providing respondents with confidence in the quality of their food. Next in 
importance were the store where the product was purchased, verifying organization, and 
certification seals, which were all statistically equal quality cues. These results are 
congruent with those of the interviews that concluded labels are the most important way 
that food quality can be communicated.   It is also evident from the above figure that the 
organization behind a certification is just as important as the presence of a seal signifying 
the certification. This clarifies conflicting messages from the interviews regarding 
consumer interest in the certification organization and affirms that the verifying 
organization is an important quality signal. Given that results presented previously showed 
a significant number of people distrust labels, the importance of verifying organization 
                                                 
31
 Confidence intervals, shown as the black horizontal lines, represent the interval that the mean value for all 
samples of the population will fall into 95% of the time. In other words, we are 95% confident that the 
population mean falls within this interval. 
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means that it may be a quality signal in its own right, and/or it may influence the 
truthfulness of labels in the minds of consumers.   
The results presented in Figure 5.11 also show that a brand name, access to further 
information, or information at in-store displays are not as important as other factors in 
signalling food quality to consumers. While specific brands may signal quality to 
consumers because of their reputation, brand names per se were not as important as the 
other factors. The relatively low importance of access to further information is also 
consistent with the industry interview results. Interviewees consistently stated that further 
information on websites was less important than other quality cues such as labels.  
Combining the evidence presented in section 5.4 with that in the current section means that 
consumers notice labels describing how food products were produced and traded, and 
perceive the verifying organization and certification seal as similarly important in signaling 
quality. Evidence in section 5.4 also highlighted that there was a significant amount of 
distrust in food labels and organic certification, though the influence of the organization 
associated with this information/certification has not been examined. The following section 
explores how respondents view various organizations as sources of information about 
farming methods. 
5.6. Exploring Perceptions of Verification Organizations 
 
Recalling the model presented in Figure 4.1, consumers’ trust in an organization 
associated with a quality assurance system is expected to impact consumer confidence in 
the quality attribute. To explore how Canadians view organizations that may be involved in 
quality assurance systems for farming methods, respondents were asked several questions 
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relating to standard efficacy, trust to provide accurate information, and the nature of trust 
across various organizations.  
The results presented are representative of the nature of an organizational type, 
rather than a specific organization – i.e. it assesses supermarkets generally rather than 
Sobeys or Whole Foods Market for example. As such, the results should be interpreted as 
an average across all organizations within a specified type. Individual organizations 
presumably can alter how they are perceived over time by developing their 
reputation/image. The effort required to build an organization’s reputation and the amount 
that a specific organization’s reputation will differ from other organizations of similar type 
is difficult to assess. As such, the following provides a snapshot of current consumer 
perceptions towards types of organizations generally to inform the discussion about their 
role in quality assurance for production-derived quality.    
5.6.1. Perceived Efficacy of an Environmentally Sustainable Standard 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, there has been increased consumer interest in products 
produced in an environmentally sustainable way. However, there are many different 
organizations certifying such claims according to various standards. The survey revealed 
how effective respondents would perceive a standard to be if it was created by various 
types of organizations. Respondents were asked:  “How effective would an environmentally 
sustainable standard created by the following organizations be?” The mean values for 
respondents
32
 are presented in Table 5.2.  
                                                 
32
 n ranges from 464 to 469 as some respondents answered “don’t know/not sure” 
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Table 5.62 Mean values representing an organization’s ability to create an effective 
environmentally sustainable standard 
 Mean values (sd) by organization type 
Values with different superscripts are significantly different (P≤0.05) 
 Government Third Party Processor Farmer Supermarket 
How effective 
would an 
environmentally 
sustainable 
standard be that 
was created 
by...
1 
3.29
a 
(0.95)
 
3.14
b 
(1.02)
 
2.62
d 
(0.93)
 
2.93
c 
(0.99)
 
2.35
e 
(0.92)
 
1
Evaluated using a five point visual analogue scale where 1=ineffective, 2=slightly effective, 3=moderately 
effective, 4=very effective, and 5=extremely effective. 
 
 Results presented in the above table show that respondents clearly delineated the 
ability of various organization types to create an effective standard; all values are 
significantly different from each other. Respondents saw government as the organization 
that would create the most effective standard. Third party organizations were ranked 
second. Recalling the discussion in Chapters 2 and 3, the confidence that respondents 
expressed in government may relate to the extensive consultation that governments 
frequently engage in prior to policy making. Governments’ broad objective to maximize 
social welfare rather that maximizing profit means they should represent the interests of a 
broad group of stakeholders – including consumer interests. The other types of 
organizations included in the question have no such operational requirement, and as such, 
respondents may not perceive standards they have created as being in the interest of 
consumers, or the environment. For example, they may serve the interests of the 
organization, but in reality be ineffectual – e.g.an organization may have an 
environmentally sustainable standard that necessitates recycling, though it does not 
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encompass the amount of paper used. The high confidence in government to set an 
effective standard is congruent with the findings of Cranfield et. al. (2007) who found that 
a sample of Ontario consumers had a significantly higher preference for organic standards 
set by a government agency compared to a farmer controlled standard or those of other 
private organizations. 
Perhaps most informative from the above results is that a standard created by a 
supermarket was perceived as being least effective. Considering that Whole Foods Markets, 
the large natural and organic products retailer, has invested considerable energy into 
standard creation, the results suggest that people may view these standards as inherently 
ineffectual. The more Whole Foods Markets establishes a credible reputation to 
differentiate itself from other food retailers, the less this would apply. The ability and ease 
for a particular food retailer to develop a credible reputation is important in determining the 
role different organizations best play in quality assurance for production-derived attributes. 
The following section will explore how Canadians trust various organization types for 
accurate information about farming methods. 
5.6.2. Trust and the Nature of Trust in Organizations 
 
Similar to the perception that some types of organizations will create more effective 
standards, is the perception that some types of organizations will make more truthful claims 
about farming methods. To evaluate how different types of organizations were perceived by 
Canadians, participants were queried about the level and nature of trust that they put in 
various organizations to provide accurate information about farming methods. Based on the 
industry interviews in Chapter 3 and previous research presented in Chapter 2 (Frewer et al. 
2005), respondents were asked to evaluate three factors hypothesized to influence their trust 
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in an organization to provide information about farming methods. These included an 
organization’s knowledge, transparency and accountability, and the extent that they 
represented the respondents’ best interests. Table 5.3 shows the mean values for 
respondents’ ratings to these questions. 
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Table 5.3 Perceived ability of organization type to provide “accurate information 
about farming methods”  
Mean values (sd)
 
by organization type 
3 
Values with different superscripts are significantly different (P≤0.05) 
Questions 
preceded by, 
“To what 
extent...” 
 
Government Third Party Processor Farmer Supermarket 
Do you Trust...
1 
3.16
a 
(0.891) 
3.28
a 
(0.875) 
2.65
b 
(0.835) 
3.13
a 
(0.878) 
2.57
b 
(0.827) 
Are they 
Knowledgeable
...
1 3.19
b 
(0.905) 
3.08
b 
(0.856) 
2.89
c 
(0.795) 
4.19
a 
(0.787) 
2.37
d 
(0.834) 
Are they 
Transparent 
and  
Accountable...
1 
2.85
b 
(0.956) 
3.06
a 
(0.931) 
2.54
c 
(0.842) 
3.18
a 
(0.951) 
2.38
d 
(0.881) 
Do they act 
according to 
your Best 
Interests...
2 
3.23
a 
(0.894) 
3.34
a 
(0.837) 
2.79
b 
(0.830) 
3.33
a 
(0.862) 
2.72
b 
(0.898) 
1
Evaluated using a five point visual analogue scale where 1=not at all, 2=very little, 3=somewhat, 4=very 
much, and 5=completely. 
2
Evaluated using a five point visual analogue scale where 1=never, 2=rarely, 3=sometimes, 4=usually, and 
5=always. 
3Participants answering “don’t know/not sure” were excluded from the above calculations. Thus the number 
of respondents ranges from 446 to 479 out of the sample (n=480). 
 
 
 Table 5.3 shows respondents placed similar amounts of trust in government, third 
party, and farmers to provide accurate information about farming methods. Food processors 
and supermarkets were similarly less trusted. Farmer organizations ranked the highest, with 
ratings for all categories being the highest, or statistically equal to the highest ratings. Also 
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of interest in the above table is that government and third party organizations received 
similar rankings across the categories with respondents revealing no clear preference 
between them. From this evidence, it appears that labels associated with government or 
third party verifications would be similarly trusted – the results of the discrete choice 
experiment will provide further evidence. Similar to Table 5.2, food processors and 
supermarkets were ranked lower than other organizations, implying that in order to obtain 
similar levels of public trust, individual supermarket and food processing companies must 
proactively develop positive reputations. The above results imply that there is not one type 
of organization that is best suited to verify production-derived quality. Indeed, farmer, 
government, and third party organizations are perceived similarly by respondents. 
These results can be compared to those found by Frewer et al. (2005) when they 
used similarly constructed questions to evaluate the role for different organizations in 
animal welfare regulation in the Netherlands. They found respondents consistently ranked 
farmers highest across all trust factors, followed sequentially by government and 
supermarkets. It is unclear why respondents ranked farmers higher in their study on animal 
welfare, though it is possible that farmers are more trusted in the Netherlands, or farmers 
are more trusted on matters of animal husbandry than farming methods generally. A notable 
departure from Frewer et al.(2005),  however, is that the current sample shows government 
and farmers to similarly represent respondents’ best interests in providing accurate 
information about farming methods, while their results showed government scored lowest 
on this indicator. This provides evidence for the anecdotal assumption that Canadians 
broadly speaking see government as a benevolent institution.  
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While the results in Table 5.3 provide an indication of how Canadians perceive the 
actions of organizations and the extent they trust these organizations for accurate 
information, they do not explain why respondents trust these organizations. To elucidate 
how each of the hypothesized components of trust affects the likelihood of a respondent to 
trust an organization, the results were analysed in an ordered choice framework using the 
approach explained in section 4.9. 
5.6.3. Explaining Respondents’ Trust in Organizations 
 
Understanding why consumers trust organizations for accurate information will help 
indicate how difficult this trust is to attain and the robustness of consumer trust to negative 
events. Using the data from the questions described in Table 5.3, an ordered probit analysis 
was performed to identify how the extent to which an organization is knowledgeable, 
transparent and accountable, and acts in consumers’ best interests relates to consumer trust 
in that organization for accurate information about farming methods. Separate regressions 
for the five organizations reveal the importance of each factor to a respondent’s degree of 
trust in a particular organization. This allows a comparison of the relative importance of 
each trust component to the perceived trustworthiness of each generic organization across 
all organizational types.  
The dependant variables for the five regressions represent the degree of trust 
respondents put in various organizations for accurate information about farming methods 
and were treated as ordinal data from 0-4 (0=not at all,1=very little,…4=completely). 
Independent variables are the responses to the questions assessing each organization’s 
knowledge, transparency, and best interests as outlined in the previous table (1,2...5 as 
described in Table 5.3). Responses to these questions were treated as continuous and 
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assumed to be linear. For example, the difference between a “not at all” response and a 
“very little” response is assumed to be the same as the difference between the response 
“very little” and the response “somewhat”. A composite variable measuring the trusting 
nature of respondents was also included as an independent variable to control for naturally 
trusting individuals. This variable was constructed by principle component analysis using 
the software SPSS (2007); the questions and weighting used to construct this variable are 
included in Appendix E.  
Regression results for the model are included in Appendix F and show that all 
models are reasonably good fits with pseudo R
2
 ranging from 0.239 to 0.335. All 
parameters are significant and of the expected sign with the exception of the composite 
trust variable for third party organizations, which unexpectedly is negative. As the ordered 
probit model is a nonlinear model, the parameters are most appropriately interpreted as 
marginal effects.  The marginal effects for each of the hypothesized trust factors are 
presented in Table 5.4 and represent the change in probability of selecting a given level of 
trust by increasing one from the mean for each independent variable. Numbers representing 
the greatest positive changes in selecting a given level of trust are bold for clarity. The 
larger the value, the more the associated factor influences a respondent’s propensity to trust 
an organization 
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Table 5.4 Marginal effects on the probability of selecting a given level of trust 
 Change in Probability of Selecting Level of Trust Mean 
 
 Not at 
All  
(0) 
Very 
Little  
(1) 
Somewhat 
 
(2) 
Very 
Much 
(3) 
Completely 
 
(4) 
 
 
Government 
Knowledge -0.005 -0.106 -0.1409 0.2431 0.009
 
3.192 
Transparent 
and 
Accountable 
-0.003 -0.050 -0.0668 0.1153 0.0042 2.854 
Best Interest -0.003 -0.059 -0.0785 0.1354 0.005 3.231 
 
Third Party 
Knowledge -0.005
 
-0.069
 
-0.174
 
0.235
 0.013
 
3.077 
Transparent 
and 
Accountable 
-0.003
 
-0.047
 
-0.118
 
0.160
 0.009
 
3.052 
Best Interest -0.004
 
-0.053
 
-0.133
 
0.180
 0.010
 
3.329 
 
Processor 
Knowledge -0.015
 
-0.083
 
0.072
 0.025
 
0.001
** 
2.887 
Transparent 
and 
Accountable 
-0.025
 
-0.132
 
0.116
 0.040
 
0.002
 
2.558 
Best Interest -0.043
 
-0.231
 
0.201
 0.069
 
0.003
 
2.790 
 
Farmer 
Knowledge -0.003
* 
-0.029
** 
-0.020* 0.048
** 
0.004
* 
4.190 
Transparent 
and 
Accountable 
-0.011
 
-0.125
 
-0.085
 
0.206
 0.015
 
3.175 
Best Interest -0.008
 
-0.093
 
-0.063
 
0.153
 0.012
 
3.327 
 
Supermarket 
Knowledge -0.025
 
-0.230
 
0.228
 0.027
 
0.000
** 
2.375 
Transparent 
and 
Accountable 
-0.019
 
-0.172
 
0.170
 0.020
 
0.000
** 
2.413
 
Best Interest -0.022
 
-0.199
 
0.197
 0.023
 
0.000
** 
2.721 
*
,
**
,denote significance at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels respectively. All other values are significant at 
the 1% level. 
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 From the above table, the examined factors of trust are evidently not of equal 
importance to respondents’ perceptions of an organization as a trustworthy information 
source for farming methods. Perceived knowledge is more important in predicting 
respondents’ trust for government, third party organizations, and supermarkets than, for 
example, food processors or farmers. This means, for example, that if a supermarket is 
perceived to be knowledgeable about farming methods, it is more likely to be trusted than a 
supermarket that does not exhibit this knowledge. Similarly, respondents perceiving 
government or third party organizations to be more knowledgeable are more likely to 
express a higher level of trust in these organizations. The results provide an indication of 
how sensitive respondents’ trust ratings of an organization are to changes in their 
perceptions of an organization’s competencies.  
 The largest values in Table 5.4 indicate factors that most influence a respondent’s 
propensity to trust an organization. As such they represent an opportunity for an individual 
organization of a specified type to increase the amount of trust that consumers put in them 
by altering how these facets of their organizations are perceived. For example, the 
relatively high values of “best interest” for processor and supermarket imply that if a food 
retailer can build a reputation for acting in the best interests of its customers, then it will be 
a more trusted information source. To some extent, this is echoed in the marketplace as 
demonstrated by Whole Foods Markets as it emphasizes that it values the health, happiness, 
and wellbeing of its customers and has built its brand image around being a source of 
“natural”, “organic”, and “whole” foods (Whole Foods Markets, 2008). This is also 
reminiscent of comments made by John Raiche (United Natural Foods) in Chapter 3 about 
how the best to way to be a credible information source is for an organization to 
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communicate its values to the customer rather than create a quality assurance scheme. The 
above results suggest that food processors, in particular, become more trusted when they 
are perceived to represent consumers’ best interests. 
 While Table 5.4 provides an indication of the sensitivity of respondents’ trust in an 
organization according to the explored factors, it does not reveal how sensitive/robust these 
factors themselves are to outside shocks. To fully understand how much effort is required 
for specific organizations to attain equal levels of consumer trust would require a much 
more complex data collection exercise to encapsulate various events that build or 
deteriorate trust. The data presented above serve primarily to suggest areas that have the 
greatest impact on consumer trust in an organization to provide accurate information about 
farming methods. Trust in government and third party organizations is likely to be most 
affected by consumers’ perception of their knowledge. Trust in farmers is likely most 
affected by their perceived transparency and accountability. Trust in a food processor is 
likely most affected by the extent they are seen to represent consumers’ best interests. 
 Having explored how respondents perceive different types of organizations to create 
and accurately communicate effective standards, the following section examines how these 
perceptions affect a simulated purchase decision. It focuses on the results of the discrete 
choice experiment that reveals respondent willingness to pay for quality verification from 
various organizations.  
5.7. Choice Experiment Results 
 
The results of the choice experiment provide insight into how respondents value 
attributes when making a discrete choice among products. Multinomial logit models have 
traditionally been used to model discrete choice; however as discussed in Chapter 4 they do 
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not easily accommodate preference heterogeneity. Consumer preferences are widely 
regarded to be heterogeneous, though the form of this heterogeneity is often unknown. To 
show the effect of this heterogeneity on the parameter estimates, results from Random 
Parameter Logit (RPL) and Latent Class Multinomial Logit (LCML) models are presented 
in this section. Comparing these estimates allows the reader to assess the impact of 
assumptions made during the modelling process on the results. Variables used in the choice 
models are described in Table 5.5. Additionally, socio demographic and psychographic 
variables that significantly explained sources of preference heterogeneity are also described 
in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.5 Variable descriptions for the discrete choice analysis 
Choice Variable Code Description 
Environmentally 
Sustainable 
SUS Dummy =1 if grains were produced in an environmentally 
sustainable manner 
Pesticide Free PES Dummy=1 if grains were produced without the use of 
chemical pesticides 
Government 
Verified 
GOV Effects coded dummy=1 if grains were verified by 
government to contain at least one of SUS or PES 
Farmer Verified FAR Effects coded dummy=1 if grains were verified by the 
farmer or a farm organization to contain at least one of 
SUS or PES 
Third Party Verified THI Effects coded dummy=1 if grains were verified by a third 
party to contain at least one of SUS or PES 
Supermarket 
Verified 
SUP Effects coded dummy=1 if grains were verified by the 
supermarket to contain at least one of SUS or PES 
Bakery Verified  Included in regressions by effects coding the organization 
attribute. Can be calculated as (-GOV)+(-FAR) + (-THI) 
+ (-SUP) 
Price PRI Continuous variable ranging from 1.99 to 4.99 
No Choice Constant ASCD Alternative specific constant for option D  
(I would not purchase any of these products) 
Individual Specific 
Variable 
Mean Description 
Trust in Government 0.35 Dummy =1 if respondents chose “very much” or 
“completely” when asked if they trust government for 
accurate information about farming methods. 
Trust in Government 
Standard 
0.43 Dummy=1 if respondents chose “very effective” or 
“moderately effective” when asked how effective an 
environmentally sustainable standard created by 
government would be 
Alternative Friendly 0 Composite variable created by principal component 
analysis representing a respondent’s interest in 
production-derived attributes (composition presented in 
Appendix G- Min -3.6, Max 2.1) 
Age 0.51 Dummy=1 if respondents are older than the sample mean 
(>47) 
Ontario 0.45 Dummy=1 if respondents reside in Ontario 
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5.7.1. Multinomial Logit and Random Parameters Logit Results 
 
Results for the multinomial logit and random parameters logit (RPL) estimation are 
presented in Table 5.6 using the estimation methodology outlined in chapter 4 (sections 
4.7.1 and 4.7.2). Train (2003) suggests that the part worth utilities from the multinomial 
logit model can be regarded as an approximation to the population averages. The Hausman 
and McFadden test (1984) was performed on the multinomial model and the necessary IID 
assumption on the error terms was violated. As expected, this means that respondents have 
heterogeneous preferences and the RPL or LCML models that accommodate heterogeneity 
are more appropriate. Further, as shown by the decreased log likelihood and increased 
pseudo R
2
 in Table 5.6,
 
the RPL model is a better fit for the data.  
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Table 5.6 Regression results for multinomial logit and random parameter logit models 
Variable Multinomial Logit Random Parameters Logit 
 Coefficient 
 
(standard error) Coefficient 
 
(standard error) 
SUS 0.944
*** 
0.055 1.382
*** 
0.140 
PES 1.190
*** 
0.055 1.598
*** 
0.134 
GOV 0.514
*** 
0.049 0.330
*** 
0.087 
FAR 0.002 0.045 0.237
** 
0.113 
THI -0.037 0.045 0.028 0.090 
SUP -0.387
*** 
0.053 -0.774
*** 
0.116 
PRI -0.775
*** 
0.023 -1.060
*** 
0.036 
ASCD -1.888
*** 
0.098 -2.666
*** 
0.131 
Derived standard deviations of parameter distributions
33
 
SUS   1.136
*** 
0.082 
PES   1.601
*** 
0.102 
GOV   0.644
*** 
0.088 
FAR   0.759
*** 
0.088 
THI   0.871
*** 
0.083 
SUP   0.348
*** 
0.123 
Log-
likelihood 
function 
-4098.094  - 3713.017 
 
Pseudo R
2
  0.1922  0. 3025  
*
,
**
,
***
 denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels respectively 
 
The results presented in Table 5.6 show that all coefficients are of the expected 
signs and all except the effects coded variable for third party verification are significant at 
the 1% level for both models. The RPL model fits the data relatively well with a pseudo R
2
 
of 0.3025. Louviere et.al. (2000) report that R
2
 values between 0.2 to 0.4 represent 
acceptable fits for choice models. Derived standard deviations of parameter estimates 
representing the spread of the random parameters are significant at the 1% level for all 
variables in the RPL model confirming that respondent’s preferences are heterogeneous. 
                                                 
33
 This represents the spread of the random parameter estimates based on normal distributions. 
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The negative and significant coefficient for ASCD is consistent with expectations. 
Following Hu (2004), who discusses the various approaches in the literature, ASCD 
represents the utility a respondent associates with not purchasing any of the loaves 
described. 
To capture the source of respondent’s preference heterogeneity, the RPL model was 
specified to include variables representing individual-specific characteristics; only those 
that had consistently significant effects and/or significantly improved the model fit as 
determined by the log likelihood test (Green, 2006) were retained. Individual specific 
variables were selected using an iterative process outlined by Darby et al. (2006) where one 
variable was added, and the fit of the model was evaluated with and without each variable. 
These variables included trust in government, belief in government standard, alternative 
friendly, residing in Ontario and age. Only respondents from Ontario showed preferences 
that differed significantly and thus variables representing the other regions were not 
included in the final estimations. Other variables that were explored are detailed later in 
Table 5.8. According to equation (4.11) on page 82, the results presented in Table 5.7 show 
the effect of these individual specific variables on the means of the estimated random 
parameters. Combinations that were not significant were treated as fixed parameters 
following Hensher et al. (2005).   
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Table 5.7 Parameter matrix for heterogeneity in mean RPL parameter estimates 
 Trust in 
Government 
Belief in 
Government 
Standard 
Alternative 
Friendly 
Age Ontario 
SUS NS NS 0.140
** 
-0.449
*** 
0.297
** 
PES NS NS 0.556
*** 
NS 0.287
* 
GOV 0.487
*** 
0.408
*** 
0.398
*** 
NS NS 
FAR NS NS NS -0.303
** 
-0.251
** 
THI NS NS 0.148
** 
NS NS 
SUP NS NS -0.334
*** 
0.322
*** 
0.307
** 
NS=not significant 
*
,
**
,
***
 denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level respectively 
 
 Positive and significant numbers for the combination of the GOV variable, 
representing government, and the trust in government and belief in government standard 
are interesting. They indicate that respondents trusting in government, and believing that a 
government standard will be efficacious receive positive utility of a similar magnitude from 
having production-derived attributes verified by government. This result provides support 
for the theoretical model outlined in Figure 4.1 that the value of a quality assurance system 
is a function of both consumer trust in the verification and composition of the standard – 
and in this case nearly equally so. 
The values in the alternative friendly column provide an indication of how 
respondents who are most likely to be interested in production-derived quality value the 
attributes. As expected, respondents with high values for this variable derive more utility 
from the environmentally sustainable and pesticide-free attributes. Also of interest is that 
these respondents who are most likely to purchase production-derived attributes attained 
significantly more utility from government verification, and less from supermarket 
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verification. This result signals that the benefits of government involvement in quality 
verification are largest for those interested in this type of food quality. As such, WTP 
estimates for the sample average will underestimate the value of government verification 
for consumers most likely to purchase food containing production-derived quality. 
 The results in the age column indicate that older respondents derived less utility 
from the environmentally sustainable and farmer verified attributes. Older respondents also 
obtained more utility from the SUP variable representing supermarket verification. These 
results suggest that older Canadians are less interested in environmental sustainability and 
have slightly different perceptions about the credibility of farmer and supermarket 
organizations than younger Canadians. 
 Lastly, the positive and significant estimates for the pesticide free and 
environmentally sustainable attributes for respondents from Ontario show significant 
regional differences across Canada. Respondents were grouped into region including 
Quebec and the Maritimes, Ontario, the Prairie Provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and 
Alberta, and British Columbia; a dummy variable was assigned to each region. Only 
residents of Ontario had significantly different preferences, the other regional variables 
were consequently not included. Evidently, farmer verification is less valued in Ontario 
whilst supermarket verification is more valued. Given Ontario`s urban concentration, it is 
possible that consumers feel less connected with farmers than residents of other provinces. 
Initial attempts were made to specify a number of socio-demographic characteristics 
expected to capture preference heterogeneity. The four characteristics presented above were 
selected using an iterative approach as they revealed the most significant and meaningful 
results and significantly improved the model fit. Other individual characteristics that were 
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explored are shown in Table 5.8. Overall, the table shows that socio-demographic 
characteristics are not very effective in explaining preference heterogeneity. Darby et al. 
(2006) find similar results when examining consumer preference for local and organic 
strawberries in Ohio. This suggests that values intrinsic to individuals are more likely to 
explain consumer preference for production-derived quality and quality verification 
organization than socio-demographic characteristics.  
 
Table 5.8 Explored effects of socio-demographic characteristics on mean parameter 
estimates for random parameters logit model
1 
 + denotes a positive effect on the parameter  
 - denotes a negative effect 
 NS=not significant (P>0.05) 
 Female Income
2 
Children Activist
3 
Farmer
4 
Post -
secondary 
Education
5 
Primary 
Shopper 
Rural 
Sustainable NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Pesticide NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Org1 NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Org2 NS NS NS NS + NS NS NS 
Org3 NS NS NS NS NS + NS NS 
Org4 NS - NS NS NS NS NS NS 
1
Evaluated using an iterative process where the individual characteristics of interest were inserted into the 
model and then removed 
2
Income greater than the sample mean (60 000) 
3
Involved or donated money to an animal welfare organization, environmental action group, community 
shared agriculture, or health related organization 
4
Respondent or family member has worked in a job related to agriculture or certification 
5
At least a university or college education 
5.7.2. Random Parameter Logit Willingness to Pay 
 
Choice models are non-linear and thus the parameter estimates are best interpreted 
in relation to estimates from the other attributes in the experiment. To provide a tactile way 
of interpreting the parameter estimates, they can be converted into willingness to pay 
estimates based on the process outlined in Chapter 4 (section 4.8). Shown below in Table 
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5.9 are two approaches to calculate WTP for attribute estimates from RPL models as 
outlined in Hensher et al. (2005). The unconditional values on the left are simulated from 
the RPL estimates presented in Table 5.6, whereas the conditional estimates on the right are 
the average of individual willingness to pay estimates. Each individual’s willingness to pay 
estimate for a given parameter is a ratio of the estimated mean of the individual’s estimated 
distribution. This is all conditional on the revealed information for each individual 
including past choices, the alternatives in a choice set, and individual specific 
characteristics (see Greene, 2007). 
 
Table 5.9 Willingness-to-pay estimates from the random parameters logit model 
 ($ per loaf) 
 
 Unconditional-Sample Conditional- from Individual Means 
 WTP 
 
95% C. I. Mean WTP  S.D. Min Max 
Sustainable 1.29 (1.04-1.55) 1.24 0.78 3.28 -1.04 
Pesticide Free 1.49 (1.24-1.73) 1.63 1.28 4.83 -1.74 
Government 0.30 (0.15-0.46) 0.65 0.64 2.29 -1.07 
Farmer 0.22 (0.00-0.42) -0.05 0.44 1.32 -1.26 
Supermarket -0.73 -(0.95-0.52) -0.43 0.39 0.60 -1.75 
Bakery 0.17 
 
-0.16 0.87 2.26 -2.87 
 
 The above table shows that making estimates conditional upon all information 
available affects WTP estimates, most notably for government, farmer, and bakery 
verification. Hensher et al. (2005) emphasize the most appropriate method is determined by 
the most plausible results. Both methods produce plausible results as shown above; the 
valuations for sustainable and pesticide-free are in-line with the premiums charged for 
organic bread. It is important to note that the unconditional WTP estimates above reflect 
the parameter estimates in Table 5.6 and do not include the estimates in Table 5.7. Thus, 
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they represent the preferences of a respondent who doesn`t trust government, doesn`t 
believe a government standard will be effective, is not likely to be interested in food quality 
from production methods, is less that 47 years old and does not live in Ontario. The 
conditional estimates include this information. Given this and that the conditional estimates 
are calculated utilizing information about taste preferences revealed through respondents’ 
choices, they are conceptually more appealing than the unconditional estimates. The 
magnitude of these estimates will be discussed later in reference to the latent class 
multinomial logit estimates. 
  As discussed in Chapter 4, specifying the source of parameter heterogeneity in a 
RPL model is limited as it relies upon variables chosen by the analyst a priori. Thus it only 
permits the analyst to assess how preferences vary according to the variables specified. As 
shown in Table 5.8, preference heterogeneity in the current sample is only partially 
explained by the observed socio-demographic characteristics. Underlying values likely to 
further explain preference heterogeneity are difficult to assess a priori. To reveal the effect 
of latent unobserved consumer characteristics on parameter estimates, a latent class 
multinomial model was estimated. 
5.7.3. Latent Class Multinomial Logit Results 
   
Using a latent class multinomial (LCML) model allows preferences to be 
heterogeneous across the sample by estimating model classes in which individuals have 
homogeneous preferences. Nilsson (2005), Hu (2004), and Liljenstolpe (2008) have found 
these models to work well when estimating consumer willingness to pay for credence 
attributes in food products.  As highlighted in Chapter 4 (section 4.7.3), the number of 
classes in a LCML model is specified exogenously by the analyst. Models with various 
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class sizes were estimated and compared using the information presented in Table 5.10. 
The five class model was selected as it had the lowest log likelihood, AIC, and BIC and the 
highest pseudo R
2
. The NLOGIT software estimates models with a maximum of five 
classes; however, given the small improvement from a 4 class model to a 5 class model as 
shown below, additional classes are likely to improve the model fit only marginally.  
 
Table 5.10 Comparing latent class multinomial logit models 
 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 Class 
Log Likelihood -3800.619 -3568.483      -3484.010      -3415.636 
Pseudo R
2 
0.2860 0.3297 0.3455 0.3583 
AIC
34
 1.98834 1.87222      1.83282      1.80217   
BIC
35
 2.01603      1.91447     1.88981      1.87355      
 
 Results for the latent class multinomial logit model with five classes are included in 
Table 5.11. The LCML model is a significantly better fit than the multinomial logit model 
presented in Table 5.6 as indicated by a log likelihood of -3415; the multinomial logit 
model had a log likelihood of -4098. No robust statistical test exists to compare the fits of 
the RPL and LCML models and thus Greene and Hensher (2003) emphasize that model 
choice is context specific.  
                                                 
34
 Akaike information criterion where k is number of parameters and n is number of observations= 
n
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Table 5.11 Latent class multinomial logit model results 
 
 Concerned 
Shoppers 
Independent 
Verification 
Seekers 
Defer to 
Farmers 
Label 
Believers 
Not 
Interested 
PES 
2.035
*** 
(0.166) 
1.599
*** 
(0.154) 
0.483
*** 
(0.123) 
2.084
*** 
(0.079) 
-0.626 
(0.208) 
SUS 
1.258
*** 
(0.146) 
1.237
*** 
(0.138) 
0.344
** 
(0.160) 
1.329
*** 
(0.076) 
0.253
*** 
(0.227) 
PRI 
-0.198
*** 
(0.057) 
-0.510
*** 
(0.057) 
-1.212
*** 
(0.066) 
-0.920
*** 
(0.034) 
-3.567 
(0.224) 
GOV 
1.018
*** 
(0.116) 
2.194
*** 
(0.130) 
-0.476
*** 
(0.172) 
0.059 
(0.068) 
0.295
*** 
(0.260) 
FAR 
0.169 
(0.130) 
-0.534
*** 
(0.143) 
1.474
*** 
(0.105) 
-0.313
*** 
(0.064) 
1.419 
(0.231) 
THI 
-0.753
*** 
(0.178) 
1.702
*** 
(0.114) 
-0.585
*** 
(0.143) 
0.162
*** 
(0.062)
 
-0.430
** 
(0.209) 
SUP 
-0.705
*** 
(0.140) 
-2.178
*** 
(0.265) 
-0.822
*** 
(0.152) 
0.203
*** 
(0.071) 
0.140 
(0.201) 
ASCD 
-0.357 
(0.363) 
1.485
*** 
(0.258) 
-1.902
*** 
(0.260) 
-3.315
*** 
(0.186) 
-13.474
*** 
(0.789) 
Class 
Probabilities 
0.220  0.120 0.123 0.352 0.186 
Pseudo R
2 
0.358 
 
Log 
Likelihood 
-3415 
 
*
,
**
,
***
 denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level respectively 
 
 
As with the RPL model, the LCML model is non linear and the estimates are best 
interpreted relative to other parameters in the model. Willingness-to-pay estimates for each 
variable measured in dollars per loaf of bread were calculated according to equation (4.14) 
and are presented in Table 5.12. Classes were named to facilitate comprehension of how 
preferences differ between classes but do not represent specific individuals per se.    
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Table 5.12 Willingness to pay estimates for random parameters logit and latent class 
multinomial logit model ($ per loaf) 
 Random 
Parameters 
Logit 
Latent Class Multinomial Logit 
Class  1 2 3 4 5 
 (Conditional 
Mean
2
) 
Concerned 
Shopper 
Independent 
Verification 
Seeker 
Label 
Believer 
Defer to 
Farmer 
Not 
Interested 
Pesticide 1.24
*** 10.26
*** 
3.13
*** 
2.27
*** 
0.40
*** 
-0.18
*** 
Sustainable 1.63
*** 6.34
*** 
2.42
*** 
1.45
*** 
0.28
** 
0.07 
Government 0.65
*** 5.13
*** 
4.30
*** 
0.06
*** 
-0.39
*** 
0.08
*** 
Farmer -0.05
*** 0.85 -1.05
*** 
-0.34 1.22
*** 
0.40 
Third Party 0.00 -3.80
*** 
3.34
*** 
0.18
*** 
-0.48
*** 
-0.12
*** 
Supermarket -0.43
*** -3.55
*** 
-4.27
*** 
0.22
*** 
-0.68
*** 
0.04
** 
Bakery
1 
-0.16 1.37
 
-2.32
 
-0.12
 
0.34
 
-0.40 
Average 
Class 
Probability  
0.220 0.120 0.352 0.123 0.186 
1
as the estimate for bakery= -org1-org2-org3-org4, significance is not applicable. 
*
,
**
,
***
 denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level respectively for the attribute 
parameter in the WTP ratio 
2
From Table 5.9. 
 
Recalling the discussion in Chapter 4, choice models are best interpreted as 
difference in attribute models. Given this, the results presented above provide an indication 
of how Canadian consumers value credence production-derived attributes and the 
verification of these attributes relative to each other. As such, willingness-to-pay values are 
most informative when considered relative to each other and not in absolute monetary 
terms. 
By comparing the RPL estimates with the LCML estimates in the above table, it is 
evident that significant preference heterogeneity is masked by the mean WTP values from 
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the RPL model. Most interesting, those most willing to pay for the pesticide free and 
environmentally sustainable attributes had their utility affected most by verifying 
organization attributes. The concerned shopper and independent verification seeker classes 
show sizeable and significant valuations for government, third party and supermarket 
verification. For both classes, willingness-to-pay for government quality verification is 
positive, while it is negative for supermarket verification. The utility associated with 
supermarket verification is negative for all classes except the label believer class. Given the 
low likelihood of having an effective standard shown in Table 5.2, and the low trust scores 
revealed in Table 5.3, it is plausible that respondents see supermarket verification as less 
credible. Farmer verification in contrast was valued differently by the various groups. 
Evidently some respondents see farmers as much more credible than others. 
The label believer class has the largest average class probability of 0.352, meaning 
that the largest percentage of respondents is in line with the estimates for this class. As 
shown by the small magnitude of WTP for the verification organizations and the positive 
and significant values for pesticide free and environmentally sustainable attributes, 
respondents in this class are unconcerned about who verifies the presence of the 
production-derived quality. Given the relatively small magnitude of the WTP for the 
environmentally sustainable and pesticide free attributes of the label believer class 
compared to the independent verification seeker and concerned shopper classes those 
respondents in the latter two classes have much stronger preferences. Further, given the 
positive hypothetical bias expected in this type of experiment, it is likely that the concerned 
shopper and independent verification seeker classes represent those respondents who would 
actually be willing to pay a significant amount in a true market situation.  
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Summing the two average class probabilities for the concerned shopper and  
independent verification seeker classes together gives a 34% probability that respondents 
are members of these classes. Willingness-to-pay estimates for all attributes in the choice 
experiment are quite large for these two classes, extremely so for the concerned shoppers. 
By extension, this indicates that a sizeable number of Canadian consumers have strong 
preferences for production derived food quality and type of verifying organization.  
While government and supermarket verification were seen similarly by both the 
concerned shopper and independent verification seeker classes, third party verification was 
valued negatively by the concerned shopper class and positively by the independent 
verification seeker class. This shows that those respondents who are most willing to pay for 
credence attributes will gain a great deal moving from the Canadian status quo of third 
party verification to government verification. In relative terms, this improvement resulting 
from the difference in the third party and government WTPs represents 141% of the value 
of the environmentally sustainable attribute and 87% of the pesticide free attribute. This 
means that moving from third party verification to government verification gives 
consumers in this class nearly the same utility as the attributes themselves.  Moreover, the 
independent verification seeker class values the government and third party verification 
attributes greater than either of the production-derived attributes. This signals that 
verification is very important to consumers interested in the pesticide free or 
environmentally sustainable attributes, and government verification is especially important 
for those who most value these attributes. This is consistent with results of the RPL model 
revealed in Table 5.7. 
134 
 
Willingness-to-pay estimates from the current study are comparable to those 
previously reported in the literature. Two recent studies employing choice experiments in 
the UK provide interesting comparisons. Balacombe et al. (2007) estimated that consumers 
were willing to pay 90% more for a food basket produced without pesticides and Chalak et 
al. (2008) report consumers would pay 180% more for bread produced without pesticides. 
The results in Table 5.11 report willingness to pay for pesticide-free bread of 65% of the 
value of the average loaf of bread 
36
 for the RPL model versus 412% for the concerned 
shopper class of the LCML model. Thus the current results show that, on average, 
respondents in the current sample were willing-to-pay less for pesticide free bread than 
those in the UK research. Onozaka et al. (2006) however show much smaller WTP for 
production attributes using a DCE for their sample of Californians.  They reveal that their 
sample was willing to pay 10 to 34% more for produce that was produced without 
pesticides and 5 to 34% more for produce from environmentally sustainable farming 
methods. Thus the average results revealed by the RPL model in the current study are 
reasonably well aligned with those of past research. 
5.8. Conclusions 
 
Results presented in this chapter suggest that one third of Canadians value bread 
containing grains produced using environmentally sustainable and/or pesticide free 
methods. Government verification of these attributes was most valued by respondents who 
obtained the most utility from these attributes. It is unclear why government verification is 
most valued, as questions probing respondents’ trust in organizations showed no significant 
difference in the ratings between government, third party, or farmer organizations. 
                                                 
36
 The average price of bread purchased by respondents was $2.49.  
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Government organizations were, however, viewed as being the most capable of producing a 
meaningful environmentally sustainable standard, and as such the preference for 
government verification may partly reflect the expectation that if the product was 
government verified, it would be verified to a government standard. 
As trust in government verification is not found to coincide with willingness-to-pay 
for government verification, it is unlikely that respondents see this verification as more 
credible per se. It is possible that the value associated with government verification stems 
from a perception that the verification is credible based on factors not examined in the 
current study. It is also possible that respondents interpret government verification as a 
quality signal itself, and not as a means to identify if a production-derived attribute is truly 
present. In this way people may think that if government is involved, it signals the validity 
of the quality attribute in general. This fits the framework outlined in Chapter 2 where 
governments can influence the discourse that defines food quality in the minds of 
consumers and act as a heuristic to signal quality. 
Respondents’ significant negative willingness-to-pay for both supermarket and third 
party verification is of concern given current market trends.  Supermarket and third party 
verification are the two most prominent forms of quality assurance systems for production-
derived quality in Canada. Generically, supermarkets are not seen as trusted information 
sources or able to create effective environmentally sustainable standards and thus the 
negative utility they endow upon respondents is not surprising. The negative willingness to 
pay associated with third party verification for the concerned shopper segment however is 
more difficult to explain.  
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Across the sample respondents saw third party organizations as equally trustworthy 
and nearly as capable of creating an effective environmentally sustainable standard. It is 
unclear how respondents who have the most negative willingness-to-pay for third party 
organizations perceive these organizations’ abilities to create effective standards or 
accurately communicate how food was produced. Future research could explore how 
consumers understand the term third party and explore more thoroughly what makes third 
party organizations credible. Overall the results show that respondents most interested in 
the production-derived attributes that were examined in this study would gain significantly 
by moving from the current status quo to a system of government verification. 
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This sixth and final chapter encapsulates and contextualizes the previous chapters. 
Research findings resulting from the theoretical framework, the supply chain interviews, 
and the consumer survey are summarized to provide the reader with an overview of the 
main conclusions. Policy implications arising from these conclusions are explored. 
Limitations arising from the research methodology are discussed to explain the 
applicability of the conclusions. Opportunities for future research spawned by this thesis 
are highlighted followed by brief final conclusions.  
6.2. Summary of Research Findings 
 
Understanding the role for government, third party, and private organizations in 
assuring production-derived food quality necessitates understanding how the involvement 
of these organizations can affect the market for production-derived quality. The literature 
explored in Chapter 2 highlighted how quality signalling, consumer search costs, and 
normative beliefs are all important areas in which the type of assuring organization can 
affect the demand for production-derived quality attributes. From an economic perspective, 
government intervention is only warranted when there is market failure. This can arise with 
production-derived attributes because of information asymmetry between buyers and sellers 
– consumers may not know what methods were used to produce their food. 
More effective quality signalling reduces information asymmetry. Effective quality 
signalling and reduced consumer search costs can improve market function by allowing 
consumer choices to more accurately reflect true preferences. If government is perceived as 
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more credible than other organizations, government involvement in quality assurance 
systems for production-derived quality attributes will increase label credibility and make 
consumer decisions simpler. Normative beliefs about what constitutes food quality are 
affected by the actions of those involved in public discourse. A credible organization will 
be trusted to communicate accurate information. Past research has identified that an 
organization’s knowledge, accountability, and extent that they represent a person’s interests 
are indicative of their trustworthiness.  
Standards play a role in simplifying a consumer’s purchase decision and form the 
basis for quality assurance systems. They act to define levels of quality and reduce the 
variance of quality across products. Consistent, reliable, and recognized standards most 
effectively signal quality to consumers and make choices easier. By their nature however, 
standards reduce product differentiation that is important to firms.    
The concepts outlined above were explored in Chapter 3 through interviews with 
supply chain members who currently market foods containing production-derived quality 
attributes. Throughout the interviews it was evident that firms are driven toward more 
stringent quality assurance systems to attain claim credibility, reduce consumer search 
costs, and competitively position themselves relative to their competitors. They were 
discouraged from more stringent quality assurance systems to maintain competitive 
differentiation or if they were able to signal quality attributes effectively without the use of 
a quality assurance system. The analysis highlighted that there are advantages and 
disadvantages for firms to become involved in quality assurance systems. Understanding 
these implications is important to comprehend who will gain, and who will lose from policy 
options involving quality assurance. 
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 Elements of an organization enabling it to signal quality to consumers were 
revealed in the interviews to be related to spatial elements of trust. The themes defining a 
trustworthy party arising from Chapter 2 including interest, competence/knowledge, and 
transparency, were discussed in the interviews. Participants’ responses relating to these 
elements can be characterised as spatial elements of trust, namely: motivational, relational 
and physical/virtual. Parties that are spatially closer will have more trust in each other. The 
spatial framework arising out of the interviews is informative for determining what 
organizations will naturally be highly trusted and thus not require quality assurance systems 
for accurate quality signalling. It means that farmers and other supply chain members who 
have personal relationships with customers are unlikely to need formalized quality 
assurance systems to accurately communicate production-derived quality. 
Lastly, Chapter 5 reported the results of a Canadian consumer survey exploring the 
concepts examined in earlier chapters. The survey focussed on the effects of verifying 
organization type on consumer choices for bread with environmentally sustainable and 
pesticide-free attributes. Government, third party, and farmer organizations were equally 
more trusted for accurate information about farming methods compared to supermarkets or 
food processors. Respondents’ trust in an organization type was revealed to be affected 
differently by the organization’s perceived knowledge, transparency, and the extent that the 
organization aligned with consumer interests. Trust in government and third party 
organizations is likely to be most affected by consumers’ perception of their knowledge. 
Trust in farmers is likely most affected by their perceived transparency and accountability. 
Trust in a food processor is likely most affected by the extent they appear to represent 
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consumers’ best interests. The results provide an indication of how a specific organization 
of the generic type could be perceived as more or less trusted.  
 When asked which type of organization would create the most effective 
environmental standard, respondents ranked government the highest followed by third 
party, farmer, processor, and supermarket organizations respectively. While the 
frameworks outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 suggested that consumers would attain more 
utility from a trusted and valid quality assurance system, these results were only partially 
supported by the results of the discrete choice experiment. Results from the random 
parameters logit model for the discrete choice experiment revealed that, on average, 
respondents received the most utility from government verification. Respondents trusting 
government and believing government would create an effective standard only accounted 
for part of the utility derived from government verification; the origin of the remaining 
utility was not revealed. 
Results from the latent class multinomial logit model revealed that those 
respondents who most valued the production-derived attributes pesticide free and 
environmentally sustainable, also most valued the verification attribute generally and 
government verification specifically. Most importantly, respondents exhibiting the highest 
willingness to pay for the production-derived attributes obtained significant negative utility 
from supermarket and third party verification – currently the most prevalent quality 
assurance systems in the marketplace. Moving from the status quo of supermarket or third 
party verification to government verification would give these respondents an amount of 
utility similar to what they obtained from the production-derived attributes themselves. 
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As discussed in Chapter 5, an individual firm’s reputation will impact the credibility 
of their quality assurance. This explains why a supermarket like Whole Foods Markets may 
have a successful quality assurance system that consumers see as credible. Consumer 
perceptions of different types of organizations more generally revealed in Chapter 5 would, 
for example, apply more directly to a coalition of supermarkets undertaking a common 
quality assurance system. Given firms’ desires to pursue quality assurance for competitive 
reasons and the negative utility garnered by a generic supermarket verification system, it 
seems unlikely that a successful quality assurance system could develop as a result of 
industry cooperation. It is far more likely that in the absence of government coordination, 
individual firms and third party organizations will further develop their own systems of 
quality assurance. Such a fragmented system has inherent drawbacks highlighted in Chapter 
2, specifically increased choice complexity and potentially reduced credibility as a result. 
More research would clarify the extent that multiple quality assurance systems contribute to 
market failure. 
6.3. Policy Implications 
 
Government intervention in a market should be motivated by the potential to increase 
social welfare. Market failure due to information asymmetry or imperfect competition is 
one example of how social welfare may be diminished without government involvement in 
quality assurance for production-derived quality. For government involvement to increase 
social welfare, the benefits from reduced market failure must outweigh the costs of 
intervention. These costs include not only implementation and monitoring costs but also 
opportunity costs resulting from reduced private sector innovation. The quantitative results 
of this thesis highlight the benefits of government involvement in quality assurance. 
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Opportunity costs were explored qualitatively in Chapter 3 arguing that firm motivations to 
innovate could be hampered by government involvement in standard formation or quality 
verification. Thus policy implications drawn from this thesis are based primarily on 
potential benefits and should be interpreted with the caveat that an assessment of the costs 
would also be necessary.   
 Results from the consumer survey show significant opportunity for consumer 
benefit if government was involved in quality verification for production-derived food 
quality. The survey concentrated on organizations that verify quality, as opposed to their 
specific roles in a quality assurance system – i.e. standard setting, accreditation, certifying, 
monitoring, enforcement, or coordination. Thus it is beyond the scope of this investigation 
to recommend specific roles for government in quality verification, though several areas for 
welfare improvement may be inferred by combining the conclusions of Chapters 2, 3 and 5. 
6.3.1. Clear Language for Production-derived Quality 
 
To mitigate problems caused by credibility and complexity concerns, Chapters 2 
and 3 highlighted the benefits of clearly understood reference standards. While third party 
and farmer organizations were revealed to be equally trusted in the consumer survey, the 
interviews also revealed that firms have an incentive to use standards comprised of criteria 
that are different from their competitors. This means that similar sounding standards may 
represent different things, thereby increasing consumer confusion and implying reduced 
demand for these attributes
37
. A potentially beneficial role for government policy is to act 
as a coordinating force to ensure that common language is used to define common criteria 
comprising various standards. For example, if firms use the phrase “no pesticides were used 
                                                 
37
 The implementation of mandatory labelling of meat grades was in response to the same situation in meat 
eating quality (see Government of Canada, 1976). 
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during crop production,” it would always represent that no fungicides, herbicides, or 
insecticides were used that would affect the environment where the crop was grown. Given 
past research (Ipsos Reid, 2006) showing that consumers often turn to government for such 
information, providing clear, trusted and coordinated communication defining the language 
used for production-derived quality seems to be an area where government could 
significantly improve consumer welfare. 
6.3.2. Standard Accuracy 
 
Respondents perceived that government standards were likely to be effective. This 
suggests that part of the benefit from government involvement may come from standards 
that are not only clear but meaningful.  Forming standards that are amenable to consumers 
and firms, however, was identified in the interviews to be a difficult task given firms’ 
desires for differentiation
38
. A compromise that would address both consumer desires for 
accurate standards and firm desires for differentiated standards could include government 
policy that ensured practices behind a standard were consistent with the message of the 
standard. For example, government could ensure that practices represented by an 
environmentally sustainable standard were not harmful to the environment. This is similar 
to the recommendation for government to provide metrics to measure the environmentally 
friendliness of a product made by Harris and Cole (2003). More effective enforcement of 
the current federal law dictating that all information on labels must not be misleading 
would be an appropriate policy response, provided the benefits outweighed the costs. 
                                                 
38
 The original formation of national grades for live pork in 1921 provides one example where producers, 
processors, and government officials worked together to achieve a workable system (Maybee, 1955).  
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6.3.3. Quality Verification 
 
Lastly, results from the survey highlighted that there is a sizeable positive utility for 
consumers most interested in production derived quality for government verification. 
Further, no estimated models showed that consumers attain negative utility from 
government verification. This suggests that Canadian consumers would attain significantly 
more utility if there was government verification of production-derived food quality. As 
specified earlier, this thesis did not examine specific roles for particular organizations (e.g. 
standard setting, certification, enforcement, etc.), as such the results only imply that 
government take a more active and visible role. For the benefits shown in the survey 
results, government would need to be clearly associated with the verification mechanism.  
Quality assurance policies that have the potential for the greatest benefit can be 
inferred from this thesis. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, policies supporting a variety of 
clearly defined standards are most beneficial for firms involved with production-derived 
quality. Combined with the results presented in Chapter 5 showing significant positive 
utility associated with government amongst Canadian consumers, government policies 
similar to those of the EU and the US involving a wide variety of standards would be most 
beneficial.  
A quality assurance system similar to the USDA Process Verified system would 
combine the benefits of a credible and recognized government seal with a diverse set of 
standards. If government ensured that these standards were truthful (i.e. environmentally 
sustainable products were not harmful to the environment) and credible (the standard was 
followed) then both consumers and firms would achieve the greatest benefit. Further, 
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coordinated verification may increase verification efficiency by reducing duplication in 
cases where supply chain members sell to multiple customers with different standards.  
An open question requiring more investigation is whether government itself should 
perform the certification or just coordinate, monitor, and manage the system. Given the 
similar role that meat grading serves to mitigate complexity and communicate quality, 
history suggests that government may best take an extensive role in the organization and 
function of the system. In addition, the increased normative pressure to value attributes 
such as environmentally sustainable contingent with extensive government involvement 
could produce positive externalities for society. Past research predicts that private firms 
will always have an incentive to cheat with credence goods suggesting that government 
certification would be better, though empirical studies relating to production-derived 
quality have yet to be completed. A final caveat is that government involvement that was 
inflexible or lethargic would be unwelcomed by proactive firms like those interviewed in 
Chapter 3. An effective quality assurance system would therefore need to be credible, 
simple, timely, and flexible enough to allow firms to differentiate their products. 
6.4. Limitations of the Research 
 
Practical limitations of this project confined its scope.  The online survey was 
undertaken only in English to respondents recruited by a market research company. Though 
the sample was broadly representative of English-speaking Canadians, it was not random 
and thus some care needs to be applied when extrapolating the results to the Canadian 
population. 
The discrete choice experiment investigated the impact of the verifying organization 
on consumer decisions for one product containing two production-derived attributes. It is 
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unclear how consumers would respond if presented with different types of products or a 
greater variety of attributes. Including more tangible attributes that consumers are more 
familiar with may result in consumers making more realistic tradeoffs in the discrete choice 
experiment and produce more accurate willingness-to-pay estimates. Further, the online 
survey may be less realistic than an experiment carried out in the grocery store, as 
substitute goods and a budget constraint are more prevalent in a normal shopping 
environment. As a result of the survey methodology, the willingness-to-pay estimates 
presented in this thesis should be regarded as optimistic values for Canadian consumers, 
and should be interpreted as relative rather than absolute values.  
Trust was conceptualized and assessed in this thesis according to these criteria: 
knowledge, transparency, and best interest. It was evident in the discrete choice experiment 
that this construct imperfectly captured the determinants of respondents’ trust in 
organizations and their willingness-to-pay for quality verification from these organizations. 
Consequently, the results were unable to determine exactly why respondents valued 
government verification and only reveal that trust in an organization does not correspond 
exactly to value attained from an organization’s quality verification.  
The necessity of defining the verifying organization attribute to represent a generic 
organization also did not allow the impact of individual firm reputations to be explored. For 
example, it is difficult to confidently extrapolate the supermarket verification results to 
Whole Foods Market. Results for the government attribute are less prone to this variation 
that the other categories that involve many more firms with individual reputations.   
 Lastly, this research concentrated primarily on the consumer benefits to quality 
verifications. To define the appropriate role for government in assurance of production-
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derived quality, quantifying both the costs and benefits of different levels of involvement is 
necessary. 
6.5. Areas for Further Research 
 
As touched upon in the previous section, an important area for future research is the 
specific role that government should play in quality assurance of production attributes. 
Discerning the impact on consumer decisions of government certification versus 
government monitoring, for example, would help to clarify the possible benefits from 
government involvement. Further, to make effective specific policy recommendations, a 
complete welfare analysis encompassing costs and benefits of different options should be 
performed. In situ research assessing how consumers actually react to different types of 
labels in a real market situation would be an essential component of this. 
Understanding the importance of universal standards and certification in reducing 
search costs and improving credibility emerges as another area for further study. The 
interviews highlighted the dual nature of universal standards to both add credibility and 
diminish product differentiation. To explore this concept properly would require 
understanding how consumers react to different numbers of standards with varying 
familiarity. The results of this type of investigation would more accurately inform the type 
of quality assurance system to best serve the market for production-derived attributes. 
Looking at the intricacies of how standard formation affects search costs and competitive 
behaviour will be an interesting subject for future research.    
  Lastly, more research examining why consumers associate positive or negative 
values with verification by various organizations would illuminate the challenge faced in 
assuring production-derived quality. Exploring more encompassing dimensions of trust and 
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deference would help to understand why some consumers associate a positive value with 
third party verification and others associated a negative value with it. More specifically, 
examining why consumers trust specific organizations and how this trust changes over time 
will elucidate the effectiveness of organizations for quality assurance. While trust and 
ability to create effective standards partly explained the results, a more complete 
explanation is warranted.  
6.6. Conclusions  
 
This thesis has outlined the factors that must be considered in determining the role 
for government in assuring production-derived food quality. The results indicate that there 
are benefits to be gained by government involvement in this market. A more detailed 
examination of the costs and benefits of specific roles for organizations will aid policy 
recommendations. Respondents trusting government to give accurate information increased 
the utility that they derived from quality verification by government. While the ability to 
create an effective standard and being trusted for accurate information about farming 
methods positively affected the utility that consumers derived from an organization’s 
verification, they only explained a portion of it. Different types of organizations are not 
equally valued for quality verification though the source of this value is only partially 
revealed. 
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8. APPENDICES 
A-  List of Interview Participants 
FA-         Anderson, Roberta. (2008) Business Development Manager – Food Alliance, 
Portland, OR. Interview April 22, 2008. 
PVF -      Boldt, Melanie. (2008) Owner/Marketing Director, Pine View Farms, Osler 
Saskatchewan. Interview, April 7, 2008.  
SG –       Fleming, Fred. (2008) Partner- Shepherds Grain and Farmer- Lazy YJ Farms, 
Harrington, WA. Interview, May 22, 2008. 
LFP-       MacRae, Rod. (2008) Local Food Plus, Toronto, ON. Interview April 21, 2008. 
SIF-        Miedema, Tracey. (2008) National Sales and Marketing Manager – Stahlbush 
Island Farms, Corvallis OR. Interview March 27, 2008. 
UNF-      Raiche, John. (2008) Vice President of Marketing – United Natural Foods, 
Dayville CT. Interview, April 10, 2008. 
PHB-      Weder, Christoph. (2008) Prairie Heritage Beef, AB. Interview, April 15, 2008. 
 
Food Alliance is a non-profit organization that operates a comprehensive third-party 
certification program for sustainably produced food. They create their own standards and 
certify products marketed across North America through both food service and retail 
channels.  
 
Pine View Farms raises and markets meat according to its own all natural protocol and sells 
it primarily to the local Saskatoon market.  
 
Shepherds Grain is an alliance of 28 family farmers that grows wheat certified as 
sustainable by Food Alliance. They market flour locally through distributors in the states of 
Washington and Oregon through retail and food service channels. 
 
Local Food Plus a non-profit organization that fosters local and sustainable food systems by 
certifying farmers and processors and linking them with local retail and food service 
consumers. They create their own standards and contract 3rd party agencies to carryout the 
inspections. 
 
Stahlbush Island Farms grows, processes, and markets organic and sustainable fruits and 
vegetables across the United States through retail and food service channels. They have 
their own brands of products and use Food Alliance Certification. 
 
United Natural Foods is the largest publicly traded wholesale distributor to the natural and 
organic foods industry in the U.S.A.. Carrying more than 40,000 products, the company 
supplies over 17,000 customers nationwide and services a wide variety of retail formats, 
including super natural chains, independent natural products retailers and conventional 
supermarkets. 
 
Prairie Heritage Beef is a partnership of eco-committed ranch families that work together to 
sustainably produce and market beef. They market their beef through food service and 
retail outlets in Vancouver and on Vancouver Island. 
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 B- Interview Questions 
Assuring Quality from On-farm Production Methods 
Questions for Industry Representatives 
 
1. Tell me about who your customers are. What makes production processes important 
to them? 
 
2. What type of on-farm production processes are you currently communicating to 
your customers? ie, natural, sustainable, local, organic 
 
a) How do you define these processes? (standard, protocol, internal/external)  
 
3. How do you want your firm or brand to be viewed by your customers? What 
activities do you undertake to support the development of this reputation? 
 
4. Describe the ways in which you currently communicate the on-farm production 
methods used for your products? (advertising, labels, certification marks, point of 
sale material) 
 
a) Have you tried other ways, if so what has worked and what hasn’t? 
b) If you use third party certification, why did you choose this particular 
certifier?  
c) Have you had any customer enquiries regarding the certifier, production 
standards, or requests relating to the credibility of the product claims? If so, 
please describe the nature of the concerns, and actions taken to address 
them. 
 
5.   How do the standards that you use to define quality from on-farm production 
methods compare to those of your competitors? (higher, same, lower) 
 
a)   Are any of these criteria unique to your organization, or do other 
organizations use them as well? 
b)   How are your customers impacted by having your criteria the same / similar 
/different than your competitors? 
 
6.  What organization would your customers see as the most credible to communicate 
production attributes?  (private, third party, government… ) Briefly describe why 
you feel they would rank them in this way. 
 
a) What types of third-party certifiers are best?  (industry associations, interest 
groups, producers,…) 
 
7.    How has your current approach to marketing production attributes evolved?  
 
b)  Has your communication strategy changed? What has worked in the past, 
what hasn’t, and why? 
159 
 
C- Consumer Survey 
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E- Construction of Composite Variable itrust in Ordered Probit Models  
 
Component Matrix for itrust variable in ordered probit regressions 
 Component Question 
 1  
Q4_4 
.785 
I always believe information on 
food labels 
Q4_7 .785 I am a very trusting person 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 
 
Total Variance Explained for itrust factor 
Comp
onent 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 1.234 61.676 61.676 1.234 61.676 61.676 
2 .766 38.324 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Factor Analysis using Principal Component Analysis 
 
Factor analysis generally attempts to identify underlying variables that explain 
variation in a set of variables. It facilitates data reduction by identifying a small number of 
factors that explain most of the variance. Principal component analysis is a factor extraction 
method used to form uncorrelated linear combinations of variables. The first component 
has maximum variance followed by successive components that explain smaller portions of 
the variance. All components are uncorrelated with another. Components with Eigenvalues 
less than one are excluded as they represent less variation than one of the included 
variables. 
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F - Ordered Probit Regression Results for Components of Trust  
Dependant variable=how much do you trust each organization for accurate 
information about farming methods? 
Coded as 0= not at all, 1=very little, 2=somewhat, 3=very much, 
4=completely 
 Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Government    
 Constant -2.189 0.257 
 Knowledge 0.795 0.080 
 Transparent 0.377 0.078 
 Interest 0.443 0.084 
 iTrust 0.160 0.054 
 Pseudo R 
2
  0.327 
Third Party    
 Constant -2.265 0.268 
 Knowledge 0.664 0.085 
 Transparent 0.451 0.083 
 Interest 0.508 0.097 
 iTrust -0.147 0.053 
 Pseudo R 
2
  0.299 
Processor    
 Constant -1.885 0.248 
 Knowledge 0.259 0.076 
 Transparent 0.417 0.079 
 Interest 0.725 0.084 
 iTrust 0.141 0.054 
 Pseudo R 
2
  0.239 
Farmer    
 Constant -1.977 0.328 
 Knowledge 0.157
** 
0.075 
 Transparent 0.680 0.073 
 Interest 0.507 0.075 
 iTrust 0.130
** 
0.052 
 Pseudo R 
2
  0.241 
Supermarket   
 Constant -2.142 0.213 
 Knowledge 0.661 0.085 
 Transparent 0.493 0.086 
 Interest 0.570 0.083 
 iTrust 0.163 0.056 
 Pseudo R 
2
  0.335 
All coefficients are significant at the 1% level unless denoted ** representing significance at the 5% level. 
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G- Composition of Interest Variable in DCE Regressions 
 
Component Matrix for interest variable used in DCE regressions to express a respondent 
interest in food products from alternative farming methods. 
  
  
Component 
 
 
 
Question 
Q3 
.615 
In the last month, how often have you purchased food 
that was natural, organic, sustainable, or free-range? 
Q4_1 
-.696 
I don’t care about the farming methods used to 
produce my food. 
Q4_2 .545 I consider myself very health conscious. 
Q4_3 
.547 
Current farming methods are harmful to the 
environment 
Q4_6 .700 I value things grown in harmony with nature. 
Q5_1 
.766 
I consider the human health effects caused by pesticide 
use when I purchase food. 
Q5_3 
.814 
I pay attention to labels describing how food was 
produced and traded when I purchase food. 
Q5_4 
-.783 
I don’t consider the environmental impact of the food 
products I purchase. 
Q5_5 -.469 Price is the most important factor when I buy food. 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Total Variance Explained for Interest Factor 
Componen
t Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
  Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 4.029 44.772 44.772 4.029 44.772 44.772 
2 .928 10.313 55.085       
3 .818 9.084 64.168       
4 .764 8.492 72.660       
5 .652 7.246 79.906       
6 .590 6.559 86.465       
7 .517 5.742 92.207       
8 .363 4.036 96.243       
9 .338 3.757 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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